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THE INTERROGATIONS OF  
BRENDAN DASSEY 
BRIAN GALLINI* 
On March 1, 2006, a pair of detectives interrogated sixteen-year-old Brendan 
Dassey—one of two defendants prominently featured in the 2015 Netflix series 
Making a Murderer—for several hours about his role in the October 31, 2005, 
disappearance of photographer Teresa Halbach.  The prosecution introduced 
statements obtained during that interrogation at Dassey’s trial.  With no 
corroborating physical evidence, those statements—including that Dassey cut 
Halbach’s throat—played a significant role in his conviction for Halbach’s 
murder. 
 Following his conviction, Dassey’s appellate arguments about the legitimacy 
of his confession focused on his March 1, 2006, confession.  Most recently, his 
petition for a writ of certiorari before the U.S. Supreme Court argued that the 
March 1 confession was involuntary and that using it against him at trial violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. 
 But the value of Dassey’s case for educational purposes involves much more 
than just a voluntariness issue.  Dassey’s case presents other more fruitful grounds 
for challenging his conviction that were either not preserved by his earlier lawyers 
or were subjected to severely flawed judicial analysis.  This Article therefore 
argues that Dassey’s case provides a special educational opportunity for law 
schools thanks to the international attention on his case and the Making a 
Murderer documentary.  Stated differently, this Article argues that Brendan 
Dassey’s story is the consummate teaching opportunity. 
 This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part II offers a brief primer on Dassey’s 
case before discussing the interrogation methods that officers used on Dassey over 
the course of numerous different interrogations from November of 2005 to March 
of 2006.  Then, Part III discusses with specificity how Dassey’s interrogations 
demonstrate the need for law schools to teach interrogation methods to students.  
Finally, Part IV explores why the Wisconsin appellate judiciary concluded that 
Dassey’s pretrial lawyer, Len Kachinsky, provided constitutionally competent 
 
* Senior Associate Dean & Professor of Law, University of Arkansas-Fayetteville.  The author thanks 
Erin Nelson for her invaluable research assistance in preparing this Article.  The author also thanks 
Gene Allen Franco for his feedback on prior drafts.  Finally, the author thanks his wife for her 
tremendous patience and support during the writing process.  Even with two five-year-olds running 
around, she makes it look easy. 
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defense representation despite failing to preserve several critical issues.  Dassey’s 
case illustrates a harsh reality for students: poor lawyering passes muster for 
Sixth Amendment purposes.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 6, 2005, a pair of detectives interrogated sixteen-year-old 
Brendan Dassey—one of two defendants prominently featured in the 2015 
Netflix series Making a Murderer—for nearly an hour about his role in the 
October 31, 2005, disappearance of photographer Teresa Halbach.1  
Interrogations, or “interviews” as law enforcement termed several of them,2 
followed on November 10, 2005, three times on February 27, 2006, and again 
 
1. Making A Murderer: Plight of the Accused (Netflix 2015), 
https://www.netflix.com/title/80000770 [https://perma.cc/J379-WCXB] [hereinafter Plight of the 
Accused]. 
2. Transcript of Motion Hearing at 14, State v. Dassey, No. 06 CF 88 (Manitowoc Cty. Ct. May 
4, 2006). 
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on March 1, 2006.3  The prosecution introduced at trial the incriminating 
statements obtained from Dassey during the March 1 interrogation;4 in other 
words, the end product of the prior five interrogations.  With no corroborating 
physical evidence,5 those statements—including that Dassey cut Halbach’s 
throat6—played a significant role in his conviction for the murder of Teresa 
Halbach.7 
To say that law enforcement’s interrogations of Dassey received substantial 
media criticism would be an understatement.8  In particular, the interrogators 
were highly criticized for utilizing the Reid Technique9—a leading 
 
3. See generally Brief of Defendant–Appellant at 7, State v. Dassey, 2013 WI App 30, 346 Wis. 
2d 278, 827 N.W.2d 928 (No. 2010AP3105); Transcript of Brendan Dassey Mishicot High School 
Interview, State v. Dassey, No. 06 CF 88 (Manitowoc Cty. Ct. Feb. 27, 2006); Transcript of Brendan 
Dassey Two Rivers Police Dept. Interview, State v. Dassey, No. 06 CF 88 (Manitowoc Cty. Ct. Feb. 
27, 2006); Transcript of Trial Day 5 at 10–11, State v. Dassey, No. 06 CF 88 (Manitowoc Cty. Ct. 
2007); Transcript of Brendan Dassey Manitowoc Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. Interview, State v. Dassey, No. 
06 CF 88 (Manitowoc Cty. Ct. Mar. 1, 2006). 
4. See generally Transcript of Trial Day 5, supra note 3, at 5. 
5. Id. at 103. 
6. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Manitowoc Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. Interview, supra note 3, at 586. 
7. See generally Dassey, 2013 WI App 30; Transcript of Post-Conviction Motion Hearing Day 
1 at 6, State v. Dassey, No. 06 CF 88 (Manitowoc Cty. Ct. 2010). 
8. Matt Ferner, 7 Terrifying Things ‘Making a Murderer’ Illustrates About American Justice, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/making-a-murderer-
criminal-justice_us_5699952de4b0b4eb759e8757 [https://perma.cc/NY59-VF7M]; Kathryn Schulz, 
Dead Certainty, NEW YORKER (Jan. 25, 2016), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/01/25/dead-certainty [https://perma.cc/MJ8L-VRGN]; 
Christina Sterbenz, A Recurring Problem in ‘Making a Murderer’ Used to Be Huge in the UK—and 
the Country Figured out How to Fix it, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 16, 2016, 9:21 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/making-a-murderer-problem-steven-avery-2016-1 
[https://perma.cc/SLY3-9W3E]; Matt McCall, ‘Making a Murderer’ Raises Questions About 
Interrogation Technique from Chicago, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 7, 2016, 10:23 PM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-reid-confession-technique-met-20160106-
story.html [https://perma.cc/FYT2-QX6R].  
9. Matt Masterson, What Leads to False Confessions? ‘Making a Murderer’ Attorneys Weigh In, 
CHI. TONIGHT (Sept. 29, 2017, 1:30 PM), https://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2017/09/29/what-leads-
false-confessions-making-murderer-attorneys-weigh [https://perma.cc/648H-3TPD]; Tanya Lewis, 
Here’s How False Confessions—Like the One Brendan Dassey Allegedly Gave on ‘Making a 
Murderer’—Happen, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 5, 2016, 3:11 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/making-a-murderer-and-the-science-of-false-confessions-2016-2 
[https://perma.cc/ZU5C-CCVG]; Duke Behnke, Attorney: Dassey Confession ‘Contaminated’, POST 
CRESCENT (Jan. 16, 2016, 7:47 AM), https://www.postcrescent.com/story/news/local/steven-
avery/2016/01/16/attorney-dassey-confession-contaminated/78744222/ [https://perma.cc/JTU5-
DCAN].  
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interrogation method10—on a juvenile suspect.11  Use of that interrogation 
method, as many have observed, is at the heart of several documented false 
confessions.12  
Popular media aside, though, Dassey’s appellate arguments about the 
legitimacy of his confession have focused on his March 1, 2006, confession.  
Most recently, his petition for a writ of certiorari before the U.S. Supreme Court 
argued that the March 1 confession was involuntary and that using it against 
him at trial violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.13 
The value of Dassey’s case for educational purposes involves much more 
than the voluntariness issue.  That issue appropriately gained prominence 
because it was the issue presented for review to the Supreme Court.14  Dassey’s 
 
10. Brian R. Gallini, Police “Science” in the Interrogation Room: Seventy Years of Pseudo-
Psychological Interrogation Methods to Obtain Inadmissible Confessions, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 529, 536 
(2010) (“A recent nationwide survey of police departments revealed that two-thirds of state police 
departments train some or all of their department’s officers in the Reid method.”). 
11. The Times Editorial Bd., Juveniles Are Owed Special Protection from Police Coercion. 
Brendan Dassey Should Serve as that Reminder, L.A. TIMES (June 21, 2018, 4:10 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-juvenile-confession-20180621-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/KN7J-BSSW]; Jane Kelly, UVA Expert: ‘Making a Murderer’ Proves Juvenile 
Interrogations Must Change, UVA TODAY (June 13, 2018), https://news.virginia.edu/content/uva-
expert-making-murderer-proves-juvenile-interrogations-must-change [https://perma.cc/GVH5-
FAC9]; Adam Liptak, Was It a False Confession in ‘Making a Murderer’? The Supreme Court May 
Decide, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us/politics/supreme-court-
making-a-murderer.html [https://perma.cc/CVA4-8YAG]; Brandon Garrett, Brendan Dassey’s False 
Confession Shows We Need to Be More Careful when Interrogating Juveniles, USA TODAY (June 9, 
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/policing/2018/06/09/brendan-dasseys-
false-confession-supreme-court-column/652915002/ [https://perma.cc/AFB9-P7F7]; MPR News 
Staff, How ‘Making a Murderer’ Exposes Flaws in Juvenile Justice System, MPR NEWS (Feb. 1, 2016), 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/02/01/making-a-murderer-exposes-flaws-in-juvenile-justice-
system [https://perma.cc/8FM8-QA86].  
12. Wyatt Kozinski, The Reid Interrogation Technique and False Confessions: A Time for 
Change, 16 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 301, 315–16 (2017); Megan Crane et al., The Truth About 
Juvenile False Confessions, INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y, Winter 2016, at 10, 10–13 (2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/public_education/insights/Juvenile_confession
s.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EYD-J3EJ]; Robert Kolker, Nothing but the Truth, MARSHALL PROJECT (May 
24, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/05/24/nothing-but-the-truth 
[https://perma.cc/4LRB-NNZV]. 
13. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, 23–30, Dassey v. Dittmann, 138 S. Ct. 2677 (2018), cert. 
denied, (No. 17-1172). 
14. Douglas Starr, In the “Making a Murderer” Case, the Supreme Court Could Help Address 
the Problem of False Confessions, NEW YORKER (June 6, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/in-the-making-a-murderer-case-the-supreme-court-
could-help-address-the-problem-of-false-confessions [https://perma.cc/W5QT-JNVM]; Andy 
Thompson, Dassey Appeal: Videotaped Confession Emerges as Key Issue in U.S. Supreme Court 
Petition, POST CRESCENT (June 4, 2018, 10:25 AM), 
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case, though, presents other perhaps more fruitful grounds for challenging his 
conviction that were either not preserved by his earlier lawyers or were 
subjected to severely flawed judicial analysis.15  Most critically, one of 
Dassey’s first lawyers failed to preserve critical Miranda-based arguments 
related to custody, waiver, and the impact of using adult interrogation methods 
on juvenile suspects.16  Although those and related issues are unavailable for 
legal disposition, Dassey’s case provides a special educational opportunity for 
law schools thanks to the international attention of his case and the Making a 
Murderer documentary.  
The question shifts, then, to how the legal academy might better engage 
students in the critical topics raised by Dassey’s case—including the role of 
false confession literature and jurisprudence.  To begin with, it starts with 
making the investigative criminal procedure course real for students.  Too often 
the books law schools teach from and the lectures professors give deal in 
hypotheticals.  What happened to Dassey, though, is not a hypothetical.  And 
sadly, his case is far from an anomaly.17  
The upshot of Dassey’s case is that law students know who Dassey is and 
they are eager to learn how he was convicted.  This Article argues that his case 
is the consummate teaching opportunity.  It proposes how law professors might 
use the diverse range of issues raised specifically by Dassey’s case to better 
 
https://www.postcrescent.com/story/news/2018/06/04/brendan-dasseys-confession-key-focus-u-s-
supreme-court-case/663874002/ [https://perma.cc/JZ2Z-A96Y]; Leah Litman, Making A Murderer 
Makes its Way to the Supreme Court, TAKE CARE (May 29, 2018), 
https://takecareblog.com/blog/making-a-murderer-makes-its-way-to-the-supreme-court 
[https://perma.cc/KT7Z-KAVK]; Leah Litman, SCOTUS Term: Making A Murderer Makes its Way to 
the Supreme Court, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 29, 2018, 6:47 PM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/05/scotus-term-making-a-murderer-makes-its-way-
to-the-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/SV95-LQKQ]. 
15. E.g., State v. Dassey, 2013 WI App 30, ¶¶ 13–22, 346 Wis. 2d 278, 827 N.W.2d 928 
(rejecting Dassey’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a mere nine paragraphs). 
16. Brief of Defendant–Appellant, supra note 3, at 38–39, 57. 
17. David Boeri, How a Teen’s Coerced Confession Set Her Free, NPR (Dec. 30, 2011, 3:22 
PM), https://www.npr.org/2012/01/02/144489360/how-a-teens-coerced-confession-set-her-free 
[https://perma.cc/4274-G8JA]; Gretchen Gavett, A Rare Look at the Police Tactics that Can Lead to 
False Confessions, FRONTLINE (Dec. 9, 2011), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-rare-
look-at-the-police-tactics-that-can-lead-to-false-confessions/ [https://perma.cc/AV3A-M6B3]. 
 
GALLINI, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 3 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/2019  9:32 AM 
782 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:777 
educate students in the investigative criminal procedure course—a course tested 
routinely on the bar exam18 and taught in law schools nationwide.19   
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part II offers a brief primer on 
Dassey’s case before discussing the interrogation methods that officers used on 
Dassey over the course of numerous different interrogations from November of 
2005 to March of 2006.  Then, Part III discusses with specificity how Dassey’s 
interrogations demonstrate the need for law schools to teach students about 
interrogation methods.  Dassey’s various interrogations illustrate some of the 
complex ways that law enforcement interrogation tactics impact application of 
Miranda doctrine.  Demonstrating the disconnect between doctrine and police 
tactics is important because so many students will be tasked in their careers 
with identifying legal issues from interrogation videos or interrogation 
transcripts.  
Finally, Part IV considers why the appellate judiciary concluded that 
Dassey’s pretrial lawyer, Len Kachinsky, provided constitutionally competent 
defense representation despite failing to preserve several viable issues.  Part IV 
blames the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington, which since 
1984 has offered the governing measuring stick for competent defense attorney 
performance.  Dassey’s case illustrates a harsh Strickland reality for students: 
poor lawyering passes muster for Sixth Amendment purposes.  Because 
Strickland demands so little from defense lawyers, law schools must fill the gap 
and demand more from students.  Dassey’s case, and Kachinsky’s lawyering, 
 
18. Most notably, criminal procedure is tested on the Uniform Bar Exam. 2018 MEE Subject 
Matter Outline, MULTISTATE ESSAY EXAMINATION, 
http://www.ncbex.org/pdfviewer/?file=%2Fdmsdocument%2F183 [https://perma.cc/353J-VB8S].  
The Uniform Bar Exam is currently administered in thirty-four jurisdictions nationwide. Jurisdictions 
that Have Adopted the UBE, NAT’L CONF. BAR EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/exams/ube/ 
[https://perma.cc/2VR5-XF7E] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018); see Law School Classes that Will Prepare 
You for the Bar Exam: What to Take and What Not to Take!, JD ADVISING (Aug. 6, 2015), 
https://www.jdadvising.com/law-school-classes-that-will-prepare-you-for-the-bar-exam-what-to-
take-and-what-not-to-take/ [https://perma.cc/44LE-ULVV] (listing criminal procedure as an essential 
law school class).  
19. See, e.g., Certificate in Criminal Law, U. ARK. SCH. LAW, 
https://catalog.uark.edu/lawcatalog/criminallawcertificate/ [https://perma.cc/RP67-SZBB] (last visited 
Aug. 16, 2018) (requiring Criminal Procedure I); Criminal Law, Justice & Policy Concentration, TEX. 
A&M U. SCH. LAW, https://law.tamu.edu/prospective/academics/concentrations/criminal-law-justice-
policy [https://perma.cc/U566-MEVA] (last visited Aug. 16, 2018) (requiring Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Procedure Trial Rights); Criminal Law Concentration, U. MISS. SCH. LAW, 
https://law.olemiss.edu/academics-programs/concentration-programs/criminal-law-concentration/ 
[https://perma.cc/6VA3-X4XJ] (last visited Aug. 16, 2018) (requiring Criminal Procedure I).  Sure, 
faculty might be interested in teaching a standalone course about Avery and Dassey, but reaching the 
broader audience of students who enroll in the criminal procedure courses is more salient. 
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collectively demonstrate what happens when the judiciary permits bad 
lawyering.  
II. 
The State of Wisconsin’s investigation into the disappearance of 
photographer Teresa Halbach led to charging two defendants, Brendan Dassey 
and Steven Avery, with Halbach’s murder.  Section A of this Part broadly 
sketches Dassey’s involvement in Halbach’s death.  It also previews the several 
Dassey interrogations by simply outlining how many took place alongside 
when those interrogations took place.  Section B then steps away from the 
Halbach case to briefly survey how interrogations take place.  Given the 
frequency with which interrogations are a part of police investigations, Section 
B squarely asserts that students must learn about interrogation techniques while 
in law school.  That contention helps to set the stage for Section C, which 
provides an overview of the Reid interrogation technique—the most widely 
used interrogation technique in the country.  
A. A Primer on the Dassey Case 
Brendan Ray Dassey was born in Manitowoc County, Wisconsin, on 
October 19, 1989, to parents Barbara and Peter Dassey.20  A brother to Bryan, 
Bobby, Blaine, and half-brother Brad, Brendan lived with his family in a trailer 
located on Avery Salvage—a forty-acre property that housed more than twelve 
buildings and roughly 4,000 junked automobiles.21  
In the fall of 2005, Dassey was a sixteen-year-old student enrolled as a 
sophomore at Mishicot High School.22  Apart from Dassey’s intense desire to 
attend his classes,23 he struggled in school.  At the time photographer Teresa 
 
20. Why Were the Averys So Unpopular?, STEVEN AVERY CASE, 
http://stevenaverycase.com/why-were-the-averys-so-unpopular/#sthash.zfJAgVEj.dpbs 
[https://perma.cc/PKP9-N5PD] (last visited July 14, 2018). 
21. Transcript of Trial Day 7 at 12–14, State v. Dassey, No. 06 CF 88 (Manitowoc Cty. Ct. 
2007); Map of Avery Property, STEVEN AVERY CASE, 
http://stevenaverycase.com/#sthash.myLkIZMn.axJ1cjuj.dpbs [https://perma.cc/XKU3-484H] (last 
visited July 14, 2018). 
22. Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 2, at 65. 
23. In the interrogation transcripts, Barb says that Brendan always wants to attend all of his 
classes.  Moreover, Brendan asked the interrogators multiple times during his interrogations whether 
he would be done in enough time to attend his classes. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Mishicot High 
School Interview, supra note 3, at 479; Transcript of Brendan Dassey Manitowoc Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. 
Interview, supra note 3, at 667; Phone Call Brendan & Mom, STEVEN AVERY CASE (May 13, 2006), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5691be1b25981daa98f417c8/t/5692fbafa128e6b30eb197ad/14
52473263584/dassey_mom_5_13_06.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2EH-NKVP]. 
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Halbach was reported missing on October 31, 2005, Dassey was enrolled in 
special education classes and was failing three of his courses.24 
Dassey’s limited academic capabilities have a history.  He began receiving 
special education services almost a decade earlier—in 1996—after intelligence 
testing revealed a full scale IQ of 74 with a verbal IQ of 65 and performance 
IQ of 87.25  Follow-up testing in 1999 indicated similar scores; his full scale IQ 
at the time was 73 with a verbal IQ of 69 and performance IQ of 82.26  Three 
years later, in 2002, Mishicot School District School Psychologist Kris 
Schoenenberger-Gross evaluated Dassey for cognitive abilities,27 which placed 
Dassey in the borderline to below average range.28  In addition to reporting that 
Dassey suffered from a learning disability, she indicated that he was identified 
with a speech and language impairment and has difficulty expressing himself 
“as well as understanding some facets of language.”29   
It is against that backdrop that Brendan was first questioned by law 
enforcement on November 6, 2005.30  By then, the Manitowoc County Sheriff’s 
Department’s (MCSD) investigation into Halbach’s disappearance had already 
focused on Avery Salvage and, in particular, Brendan’s uncle, Steven Avery.31  
For many reasons, MCSD’s focus on Avery was not surprising; after all, it 
thought Avery was the last one to see Halbach alive.32  At a minimum, though, 
no one disputes that Halbach visited Avery on the Avery Salvage property on 
October 31 at approximately 2:30 p.m. to take pictures of a van Avery hoped 
to sell in Auto Trader magazine.33  That visit, alongside Avery’s three calls to 
 
24. Transcript of Interview of Brendan Dassey by Marinette Cty. Detectives at 46, State v. 
Dassey, No. 06 CF 88 (Manitowoc Cty. Ct. Nov. 6, 2005); Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 
2, at 66, 92, 94. 
25. Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 2, at 85–86. 
26. Id. at 87. 
27. Schoenenberger-Gross relied on the Woodcock-Johnson III Test of Cognitive Abilities, 
which evaluates an individual’s overall cognitive intelligence with a series of tests in the areas of 
Verbal Ability, Thinking Ability, and Cognitive Efficiency. Mary G. Rizza et al., Profile Analysis of 
the Woodcock-Johnson III Tests of Cognitive Abilities with Gifted Students, 38 PSYCHOL. SCHS. 447, 
449 (2001).  
28. Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 2, at 88–89. 
29. Id. at 90–91. 
30. Marinette Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. Interview of Brendan Dassey at 1, State v. Dassey, No. 06 CF 
88 (Manitowoc Cty. Ct. Nov. 6, 2005). 
31. Id.  
32. Marinette Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. Interview of Steven Avery at 1, State v. Avery, 2011 WI App 
124, 337 Wis. 2d 351, 804 N.W.2d 216 (No. 2010 AP 411). 
33. Id. 
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Halbach on the day she disappeared, caused law enforcement to obtain a 
November 5 warrant to search Steven Avery’s trailer and Avery Salvage.34 
Skeptics have a different view of why law enforcement came to focus on 
Steven Avery.  In July of 1985, Penny Beernsten was raped on a Lake Michigan 
beach and the Manitowoc County Sheriff’s Department arrested Avery.35  
Avery was tried and convicted for Beernsten’s rape,36 despite his supported 
alibi that he was forty miles away at the time of the attack,37 and sentenced to 
serve thirty-two years in prison.38  DNA testing exonerated Avery eighteen 
years later and, following his release from prison in September of 2003, Avery 
sued the Manitowoc County Sheriff’s Department for thirty-six million 
dollars39—a sum that MCSD could not afford.40  By the time of Halbach’s 
disappearance, Avery’s civil litigation team had already productively 
completed a number of depositions and were scheduled to depose former 
Sheriff, and named defendant, Thomas Kocourek on November 10.41  Some 
believed then, and still do, that MCSD investigated Avery—and shortly 
thereafter arrested him—to avoid exposure to potentially crippling financial 
liability.42 
How Dassey came onto MCSD’s radar followed a more intuitive path.  On 
November 6, 2005, Avery Salvage was already in the hands of law enforcement 
as it began its second day of searching the large property.43  At approximately 
11:55 a.m., Marinette County detectives spotted two young men driving Steven 
 
34. Steven Avery 10/31/2005 Phone Call Records, STEVEN AVERY CASE, 
http://stevenaverycase.com/steven-avery-phone-call-records#sthash.a37fHcSz.dpbs 
[https://perma.cc/WMV4-AFSZ] (last visited July 14, 2018).  See generally Search Warrant, Avery, 
2011 WI App 124 (No. 2010AP411), http://www.stevenaverycase.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Nov-5-Search-Warrant-and-Affidavit-and-Return.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NZ6H-8NAP]. 
35. State v. Avery, 213 Wis. 2d 228, 230, 570 N.W.2d 573, 575 (Ct. App. 1997). 
36. Id. 
37. See id. 
38. Wis. Dept. of Justice, Correspondence/Memorandum Avery Review, STEVEN AVERY CASE 
2 (Dec. 17, 2003), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5691be1b25981daa98f417c8/t/56932cf3dc5cb46e49ddea08/14
52485876920/DOJ+-+2003+Steve+Avery+Review+Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/9X2E-Y36H]. 
39. Complaint and Jury Trial Demand at 14, Avery v. Manitowoc County, No. 04 CV 986 (E.D. 
Wis. 2004). 
40. See generally Plight of the Accused, supra note 1. 
41. Making a Murderer: Turning the Tables (Netflix 2018), 
https://www.netflix.com/title/80000770 [https://perma.cc/L49B-WTVX]. 
42. Plight of the Accused, supra note 1. 
43. Transcript of Trial Day 1 at 48–49, State v. Dassey, No. 06 CF 88 (Manitowoc Cty. Ct. 2007). 
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Avery’s car—the subject of a separate search warrant—and stopped them.44  
After identifying the car’s occupants as Steven’s nephews, Bryan Dassey and 
Brendan Dassey, who were on their way to purchase Mountain Dew,45 the 
detectives seized the vehicle and asked to speak with Bryan and Brendan 
separately.46  The roadside conversation that followed constitutes the beginning 
of Brendan’s long interrogation journey—a journey that culminated with his 
March 1, 2006, confession and subsequent conviction for participating in 
Halbach’s murder for which he received a life sentence.  
The Making a Murderer documentary explores only the March 1 
confession.  It neither addresses—nor even mentions—any of Dassey’s other 
Reid interrogations.  Dassey’s interactions with law enforcement during those 
interrogations were critical contributors to his March 1 “confession.”  The most 
notable of these are an interrogation that occurred on November 6, 2005, and 
three interrogations that happened on February 27, 2006.  To appreciate what 
took place on those dates, though, some context for—and understanding of—
interrogation methods is critical.  We turn next to the most popular of those 
methods.   
B. Why Interrogation Methods Belong in the Classroom 
At the core of Dassey’s heart-breaking story is the Reid interrogation 
technique and the failure of investigators and his trial counsel alike to 
understand how that technique operates—both generally and specifically on the 
juvenile suspect.  
The vast majority of American law enforcement deploy the same nine-step 
interrogation method developed and formalized over decades dating back to 
1942.47  The true effect of the Reid technique is difficult to appreciate until you 
understand the strategies underlying the method.  That, in turn, matters to 
lawyers because it may drive when Miranda rights attach to a suspect—
particularly when Miranda custody begins—as opposed to when Miranda 
should attach.  
Inside law school classrooms, the investigative criminal procedure course 
often dedicates considerable time to Miranda jurisprudence.  And appropriately 
so.  But an understanding of Miranda is just one-half of the equation.  
Understanding interrogation methods alongside the accompanying social 
 
44. Marinette Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. Interview of Brendan Dassey, supra note 30, at 1. 
45. Transcript of Interview of Brendan Dassey by Marinette Cty. Detectives, supra note 24, at 
48. 
46. Marinette Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. Interview of Brendan Dassey, supra note 30, at 1. 
47. FRED E. INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 71–118 (1942) (outlining 
a series of techniques for criminal interrogations).  
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science literature is the other half.  Law schools can help navigate the bridge 
between interrogation methods and the constitutional law that governs them.   
I have had the privilege of teaching the investigative criminal procedure 
course consistently for the past decade.  After teaching it a handful of times, 
my curiosity about some of the material’s nuances grew.  One nuance—or what 
I perceived to be a disconnect—stood out to me above all others: the 
relationship between interrogation methods and Miranda v. Arizona.48  Across 
several pages of the Miranda majority, Chief Justice Warren extensively 
discusses interrogation manuals.49  He even relied on their prevalence, in part, 
to justify the Court’s creation of the now famous Miranda warnings.50  
If interrogation methods were so important to the Miranda Court’s holding, 
why wasn’t I teaching them to students?  And which method should I focus on?  
Once again, Miranda had answers.  Buried in the weeds of the Miranda 
opinion I rediscovered a handful of footnotes that, I confess, I had not 
previously focused on in prior classes.  There, across more than ten footnotes, 
Chief Justice Warren cited heavily to Criminal Interrogation and Confessions 
by John E. Reid and Fred E. Inbau (Williams & Wilkins Company, 1962).51  He 
even noted in a particular footnote that the Reid text “had rather extensive use 
among law enforcement agencies and among students of police science, with 
total sales and circulation of over 44,000.”52   
I was intrigued.  In the summer of 2009, I dedicated myself to learning the 
method.  Among many other things, I learned that the 44,000 figure Chief 
Justice Warren cites to describe the prevalence of the Reid text is dramatically 
out of date.  Today, investigators learn interrogation techniques from a 
business—John E. Reid & Associates.53  The prevalence of the Reid 
technique—as taught in seminars and described in Criminal Interrogation and 
Confessions—cannot be overstated.  Indeed, John E. Reid & Associates is the 
largest, best-known provider of interrogation training in the United States.54 
 
48. 384 U.S. 436, 448–56 (1966).  
49. Id.  
50. See id. 
51. Id. at 449 nn.9–10, 450 nn.12–13, 452 nn.15–17, 454–55 nn.20–23.  
52. Id. at 449 n.9.  
53. JOHN E. REID & ASSOCIATES, INC., www.reid.com [https://perma.cc/VZZ4-9DH9] (last 
visited June 29, 2018). 
54. Training Programs, JOHN E. REID & ASSOCIATES, INC., 
www.reid.com/training_programs/r_training.html [https://perma.cc/7Z2T-TRVG] (last visited June 
29, 2018). 
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Officers from every U.S. state use the Reid method.55  A nationwide survey 
of police departments revealed that two-thirds of state police departments train 
some or all of their department’s officers in the Reid method.56  The Reid 
technique also claims international reach.57  According to John E. Reid & 
Associates, participants in Reid training come from “every U.S. State and 
Canadian Province, as well as various countries in Europe, Asia and the Middle 
East.”58  The United States military law enforcement also relies on the 
technique.59  
In total, Reid & Associates boasts that more than 500,000 law enforcement 
and security professionals have attended its interrogation seminars since they 
were first offered in 197460—in other words, more than ten times the number 
who learned the technique in 1966 when Miranda was published.61  
The prevalence of the Reid technique speaks for itself.  But its 
pervasiveness hides a powerful reality: law enforcement and law students are 
learning from different playbooks.  That is, law enforcement is learning an 
interrogation technique without necessarily focusing on the constitutional law 
that governs that technique.  Meanwhile, law students are learning the 
governing law without learning the technique.  That must change and, again, 
Dassey’s case demonstrates why knowledge of the technique—as incorporated 
into a motion to suppress—could have meaningfully impacted the admissibility 
of his March 1, 2006, “confession.”  
C. Understanding the Reid Technique 
The Reid interrogation method is based on the Criminal Interrogation and 
Confessions book.  The text is long.  Now in its fifth edition, the authors provide 
449 pages of instruction.62  The most important thing to understand within that 
sea of text is that Reid teaches a two-part approach to questioning a suspect—
the first part being an “interview” and the second being “interrogation.”63  
 
55. Id. 
56. Marvin Zalman & Brad W. Smith, The Attitudes of Police Executives Toward Miranda and 
Interrogation Policies, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 873, 920 (2007).  
57. Training Programs, supra note 54. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449 n.9 (1966).  
62. FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 4 (5th ed. 2013). 
63. Id. at 6–7. 
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Against the organization of the Reid technique lies its biggest criticism: use of 
the technique produces false confessions.64  
1. Interview vs. Interrogation 
The training manual begins by discussing a “behavior analysis interview” 
and distinguishing it from an “interrogation.”65  According to Reid, an interview 
is a non-accusatory information gathering exercise where the examiner should 
ask a series of “behavior-provoking questions.”66  From a suspect’s responses 
to those questions, the investigator “will generally be able to classify the overall 
responses to those questions as either fitting the description of an innocent or 
guilty suspect.”67  
By contrast, a Reid interrogation commences “when the investigator is 
reasonably certain of the suspect’s guilt,” which certainty may arise from “the 
suspect’s behavior during an interview.”68  It is at that point when, in a 
controlled environment, the interrogator should display an air of unwavering 
confidence in the suspect’s guilt and employ the nine-step Reid interrogation 
technique.69  
Some steps in the confrontation-based Reid technique are more important 
than others.  Step one, for example, directs the interrogator to “initiate the 
interrogation with a direct statement indicating absolute certainty in the 
suspect’s guilt.”70  Step two directs the interrogator to begin “theme” 
development.71  The theme should present the suspect with a moral—not 
legal—excuse for committing the offense.72  
The first two steps and those that follow build to step seven.  Once there, 
the interrogator asks the suspect an “alternative question,” which provides the 
suspect “a choice between two explanations for possible commission of the 
crime.”73  No matter the answer, though, the suspect must offer an incriminating 
 
64. See, e.g., Naomi E. S. Goldstein et al., Waving Good-Bye to Waiver: A Developmental 
Argument Against Youths’ Waiver of Miranda Rights, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (2018); 
Kozinski, supra note 12, at 315–20; Tracy Hresko Pearl, Fifty Years Later: Miranda & the Police, 50 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 63, 76 (2017). 
65. INBAU ET AL., supra note 62, at 3–4. 
66. Id. at 154. 
67. Id. at 168. 
68. Id. at 5. 
69. Id. at 187. 
70. Id. at 193. 
71. Id. at 188. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 293. 
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response.74  For example, in a theft case, the interrogator may ask “[d]id you 
blow that money on booze . . . or did you need it to help out your family?”75  
Once the suspect admits involvement in the particular crime, the remaining 
steps counsel investigators on how to obtain a fuller confession and reduce it to 
writing.76  
When an officer shifts to the interrogation portion of Reid, the officer has 
made a direct assessment of guilt and is now proceeding to gather evidence to 
support guilt.77  Problematically, Miranda may or may not have attached at that 
critical moment because the Miranda custody standard places insufficient 
weight on the officer’s decision about the suspect’s guilt.  At a bare minimum, 
Miranda should apply the moment when an officer decides to pursue a 
confession using the nine-step Reid interrogation method.  That’s not to say, 
though, that Miranda has no application to the behavior analysis interview.  In 
some cases, it’s certainly possible for a suspect to be in custody at that time.  In 
this way, the Miranda custody standard is simultaneously over- and under-
inclusive.  
2. False Confessions 
There is much to discuss about the technique and the criticism it elicits.  But 
one piece of critical feedback has persisted for years both in legal scholarship 
and popular media outlets alike: the Reid method produces false confessions.78 
Hoping to form my own opinion about this criticism, I attended Reid 
training last year.  I learned a lot.  I now both agree and disagree that the Reid 
method produces false confessions.  Here is the scene: It’s me and roughly forty 
members of law enforcement from varied backgrounds crammed in a medium-
sized hotel ballroom in May 2017 in downtown Atlanta.  I’m the only unarmed 
attendee.  
Over the course of several days, I learned insider Reid techniques related 
both to interviewing and interrogating, including how to identify verbal and 
non-verbal behavior indicative of truth or deception, how to move from an 
interview to an interrogation, and how to develop crime-specific interrogation 
themes.  I also learned that, if you know Reid, you can quite easily identify the 
precise moment an interrogation begins.  In an interview, the interviewer should 
 
74. Id. at 294. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 189, 303–27. 
77. Id. at 6. 
78. Kozinski, supra note 12, at 315–16; Eli Hager, A Major Player in Law Enforcement Says it 
Will Stop Using a Method That’s Been Linked to False Confessions, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 9, 2017, 7:44 
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/reid-technique-false-confessions-law-enforcement-2017-3 
[https://perma.cc/GE5R-CS8J]. 
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do very little talking but, in an interrogation, the interrogator should do most of 
the talking.  That makes sense in Reid methodology because the interrogation 
is designed simply to confirm what the interrogator already assumes—that the 
suspect is guilty and the interrogation is merely an opportunity for the suspect 
to tell his side of the story.  
After the multi-day training finished, I casually asked for the instructor’s 
thoughts on why critics believe the Reid method produces false confessions.  
He explained that it’s not the technique, but rather how investigators use it.  He 
commented that investigators get themselves in trouble by cherry-picking from 
the interrogation steps or, worse, jumping into an interrogation without first 
conducting an interview.  
I have since arrived at a handful of conclusions about the Reid technique.  
First, it works.  It works in the sense that it does well at eliciting incriminating 
statements (I did not say truthful or accurate incriminating statements).  Second, 
it is powerful and dangerous.  Because it works, it should be viewed like a 
weapon that can fall into the wrong—i.e., poorly trained—investigator’s hands. 
Third, it lacks oversight and continuing education.79  All of the program’s 
graduates are apparently qualified to interrogate suspects.  Sure, officers may 
(I hope) undergo additional training,80 but that’s the point: there is no central 
oversight body to require additional training.  In other words, there are no ABA 
site teams for interrogators and, moreover, Reid training is not legal training.  
Fourth, it has a high risk of misuse.  Because there is no required additional 
training—and because the law does not map well with Reid—the risk that 
interrogators will misuse it is much higher.  Finally, its misuse can produce 
false confessions.  
III. 
Reviewing interrogations with a fuller appreciation of the Reid method’s 
nuances (particularly distinguishing between when an investigator engages in a 
Reid interview vs. a Reid interrogation), has dramatically altered how I 
conceptualize and teach Miranda’s protections.  Dassey’s case forcefully 
 
79. See Hayley M. D. Cleary & Todd C. Warner, Police Training in Interviewing and 
Interrogation Methods: A Comparison of Techniques Used with Adult and Juvenile Suspects, 40 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 270, 271 (2016).   
80. The Reid website volunteers, “[s]ome organizations offer a generic certification after an 
individual has attended a seminar and passed a written examination.”  Based on attending a series of 
additional seminars alongside accruing certain on-the-job experiences, Reid & Associates will provide 
that the person is a “Certified Interviewer.” Frequently Asked Questions: What Does it Mean to be a 
Certified Interviewer?, JOHN REID & ASSOCIATES, INC., http://www.reid.com/faq/ 
[https://perma.cc/BP79-W3LA] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).   
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illustrates why that classroom change is necessary.  Or, more precisely, 
Dassey’s case demonstrates why knowledge of the Reid technique matters in 
criminal practice.  
The Making a Murderer Netflix documentary series focuses in episode 
three on Dassey’s March 1, 2006, interrogation.81  And appropriately so.  As 
noted, that Reid interrogation was the subject of Dassey’s petition for Supreme 
Court review.82  But the documentary omits other critical Reid interrogations 
of Dassey that set the table for Dassey’s March 1 “confession”—particularly 
law enforcement’s obvious Reid interrogations of Dassey on November 6, 
2005, and three interrogations on February 27, 2006.  The documentary, in fact, 
neither explores—nor even mentions—these other Reid interrogations of 
Dassey.  But Dassey’s interactions with law enforcement during those 
interrogations were critical contributors to his March 1 “confession.”  
This Part considers each of the Dassey interrogations in turn alongside the 
major legal issues that arise from each.  Those issues generally correspond with 
some of the major topics in the investigative criminal procedure course.   
A. The November 6, 2005 Interrogation 
As noted briefly earlier, Dassey was first questioned by law enforcement 
on November 6, 2005.  Once Marinette County Detectives Anthony J. O’Neill 
and Todd Baldwin stopped a car with Bryan Dassey and Brendan Dassey inside, 
the detectives seized the vehicle and asked to speak with Bryan and Brendan 
separately.83  
The officers began to question Dassey after separating him from his brother 
and placing him inside the detectives’ squad car.  Once there, O’Neill did not 
advise Brendan Dassey of his Miranda rights and instead informed Dassey that 
he was not under arrest.84  Although detectives had seized the vehicle Dassey 
was driving and towed it away, O’Neill also told Dassey that he was free to 
leave at any time.85  During the roadside questioning, Dassey relayed 
foundational details that would cement law enforcement’s belief in his 
involvement in Halbach’s murder.  
 
81. Steven Avery & Brendan Dassey Cases, Brendan Dassey Police Interview/Interrogation 
Part #1 (Making a Murderer Steven Avery Case), YOUTUBE (Dec. 28, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYOaIDxirHE [https://perma.cc/LZ4H-UVHQ]. 
82. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 17–30. 
83. Transcript of Trial Day 4 at 105–07, State v. Dassey, No. 06 CF 88 (Manitowoc Cty. Ct. 
2007).  
84. Id. at 106. 
85. Id. 
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As far as Reid, though, the November 6 interrogation offers a perfect 
example of how knowledge of the technique allows for identifying the precise 
moment when the detectives shift from a Reid interview (which is assessment-
focused) into use of the nine-step technique to interrogate Dassey (which 
presumes guilt).  But the November 6 interrogation also offers a good example 
of another concern: jumping into an interrogation without completing the 
interview.  Done properly, an investigator performs a Reid interview and, 
following the interview, performs an independent investigation to either 
corroborate or discredit a suspect’s story.86  Only after doing so should an 
interrogation commence.87  But in Dassey’s case—very early on—we see an 
investigator perform an interview and interrogation all in one session while 
cherry-picking steps from the nine-step interrogation technique.  Let’s get 
specific.   
O’Neill and Baldwin took turns questioning Dassey in the squad car for 
approximately forty-five minutes.  For the first roughly twenty minutes of the 
interaction, the detectives were formal with Dassey but non-confrontational.88  
During that portion, Dassey’s story is simple.  He says that he never saw 
Halbach on the afternoon of October 31—the day she came to visit Avery—
when the school bus dropped him off at home.89  But at roughly the twenty-
minute mark of the questioning, the tenor changes dramatically and O’Neill 
shifts into an interrogation.90  Following a long pause, which in my opinion 
signals the shift, the detectives have this critical exchange with Dassey: 
BALDWIN: Yeah.  You remember that girl taking that picture.  
You’re gettin’ off the bus, it’s a beautiful day, it’s daylight and 
everybody sees her, you do too.  Do you remember seeing that 
girl standing there taking a picture? 
DASSEY:  Maybe, I don’t know . . . don’t remember. 
BALDWIN:  Brendan, come on. 
O’NEILL:  You do know, don’t you[?]  Brendan, you’re not 
going to disappoint any of us.  Think about that girl, was that 
girl standing there taking a picture that day? 
DASSEY:  Maybe. 
O’NEILL:  Ah, it’s either a yes or no, I mean I’m not puttin’ 
nothin’ in your mind.  You tell me if you remember that girl 
standing there taking pictures.   
 
86. INBAU ET AL., supra note 62, at 354–56. 
87. See id. at 6, 169.  
88. Transcript of Interview of Brendan Dassey by Marinette Cty. Detectives, supra note 24, at 
1–17. 
89. Id. at 8. 
90. See id. at 17.  
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DASSEY:  [No reply.] 
O’NEILL:  Was she?  Huh?  Why won’t you tell me? 
DASSEY:  I was just trying to think of if I seen her. 
O’NEILL:  Well did you see her standing there taking a 
picture? 
DASSEY:  Yeah. 
O’NEILL:  Why didn’t you tell me that?  You scared? 
DASSEY:  [No reply.] 
O’NEILL:  Huh? 
DASSEY:  Yeah.91 
The remaining twenty minutes of the interrogation persist in similar 
confrontational fashion.  Both O’Neill and Baldwin push Dassey to say, apart 
from admitting that he saw Halbach, that he saw Halbach’s car and, moreover, 
that he knew a bonfire in Avery’s yard was planned for the week of October 
31.92  Dassey also admitted speaking with Avery on October 31 and seeing him 
in his garage that evening.93  The detectives entice those details from Dassey 
by quite remarkably reassuring him that he’s not going to jail: “Okay, let’s get 
beyond being scared, let’s get beyond the idea of you getting in trouble and 
goin’ to jail cuz that’s not gonna happen, okay?”94  The interview concluded 
after nearly fifty-four minutes,95 and the detectives took Brendan home 
“without incident.”96 
 
91. Id. at 17–18. 
92. Id. at 10, 13, 29. 
93. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Manitowoc Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. Interview, supra note 3, at 
545–46. 
94. Transcript of Interview of Brendan Dassey by Marinette Cty. Detectives, supra note 24, at 
36. 
95. Id. at 48. 
96. Marinette Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. Interview of Brendan Dassey, supra note 30, at 1–2.  In his 
written report following the November 6 interview, Detective O’Neill specifically noted the 
inconsistencies in Brendan’s statement:  
During the interview Brendan told us that he lives with his mother on Avery Road 
next to his uncle Steven Avery.  He told us that he had never seen Teresa Halbach 
nor her Toyota SUV at their property on Avery Rd.  When I asked Brendan 
specifically about seeing either Halbach or her vehicle on Monday October 31st 
2005 he again told us that he had not seen either. 
. . .  
When I confronted Brendan about seeing Teresa Halbach when he had 
gotten off the bus with his brother on that Monday, Brendan now said that he had 
seen Teresa Halbach and her vehicle and that he did not tell us because he did not 
want to go to jail.  When I asked Brendan as to what he had seen of Teresa, 
Brendan said that while he was walking down the driveway with his brother they 
had moved off to the side of the driveway to allow the Toyota SUV to go by.  
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The legal impact of that November 6 roadside questioning is relatively 
clear: Dassey was in custody for Miranda purposes beginning at the twenty-
minute mark of the interview.  Custody for Miranda purposes is an objective 
inquiry that exists when “a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree 
associated with formal arrest.’”97  The initial determination of custody “depends 
on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views 
harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”98  
In the context of the interrogation, the question is whether a reasonable person 
would have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and 
leave.99  The suspect’s age, so long as it’s known to the officer at the time of 
police questioning, is a relevant factor in the custody analysis.100  
Despite O’Neill telling Dassey at the outset that he was not under arrest and 
was free to leave at any time, those pro forma disclaimers, which many lower 
courts find persuasive,101 are worthless at the moment when confrontational 
questioning began—or, in other words, when Reid interrogation began.  
Detectives used a handful of Reid steps to push Dassey into changing his story, 
most notably directly confronting Dassey (step 1), developing a theme by 
encouraging Dassey to “think about the girl” (step 2), minimizing his 
involvement by telling him he will not go to jail (step 2), and overcoming 
Dassey’s denials (step 3)—among other Reid tactics.   
Reid aside, the car Dassey was driving had been seized and towed away.  
Dassey was therefore dependent on law enforcement for transportation.  When 
considered alongside Dassey’s educational background and the fact that Dassey 
was questioned in relay fashion by two officers in the backseat of a squad car 
with closed doors, it is clear that no reasonable person in Dassey’s shoes would 
feel free to terminate the encounter and leave.   
 
Brendan told us that the vehicle had been traveling out of the driveway toward 
the road and that it had only been on the property for five minutes.   
When asked again as to if he had seen Teresa out of the vehicle by the van 
by his and his uncles home Brendan now told us that while he was in his home 
after walking down the driveway to his home, from the kitchen by the kitchen 
sink window Brendan had seen his uncle Steven Avery and the girl taking pictures 
by the van parked in front of his home.  
97. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984). 
98. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994). 
99. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). 
100. J. D. B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277 (2011). 
101. Transcript of Interview of Brendan Dassey by Marinette Cty. Detectives, supra note 24, at 
1. 
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Equally clear, the detectives’ direct and accusatory questioning constituted 
Miranda interrogation.102  Dassey, then, should have received Miranda 
warnings at roughly the twenty-minute mark of the “interview.”  Absent those 
warnings, the Reid-savvy defense attorney should win a suppression motion to 
suppress the statements Dassey made in the squad car (assuming the state 
wanted to introduce them against Dassey).  But ignorance of Reid might cause 
a defense attorney to reach a different result.  After all, under many prevailing 
attorney perspectives, Miranda never attached because of Detective O’Neill’s 
boilerplate qualifiers that Dassey was not under arrest and was “free to leave.”  
Also problematic, the Reid technique separates an interview from an 
interrogation, but Supreme Court Miranda jurisprudence provides just one 
standard for both “custody” and “interrogation.”103  Use of a singular custody 
standard means that a suspect might be in custody—or not—during either a 
Reid interview or interrogation.  
Admittedly, the state never sought to use Dassey’s November 6 statements 
as direct evidence of Dassey’s guilt at trial because, by then, it had Dassey’s 
detail-laden March 1, 2006, confession to work with.  But during the trial’s 
fourth day, the state introduced audio from the November 6 interview in order 
to ask Detective O’Neill about his impressions of Dassey’s demeanor.104  
During his testimony, O’Neill said that Dassey had “an inner struggle” and that, 
in his opinion, Dassey “was hiding something.”105  Because those comments 
were designed to provide the jury more context for why investigators conducted 
subsequent interrogations of Dassey, the November 6 interrogation stands more 
as a cautionary tale for use in the classroom.  Prospective prosecutors and 
defense attorneys alike can clearly see how knowledge of the Reid technique 
informs Miranda’s attachment and, more precisely, when it should attach.   
B. The February 27, 2006 Schoolhouse Interrogation 
After the November 6, 2005, roadside interrogation, police interviewed 
Brendan again four days later.  The transcript from this interview is discussed 
in Dassey’s appellate brief: 
During a second interview on November 10, [2005], Brendan 
told police that he had attended a bonfire in Steven’s yard 
around November 1.  He stated that he and Steven had burned 
branches, wood, a few old tires, and a junked car seat—but he 
 
102. Id. at 18. 
103. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447–49 (1966). 
104. Transcript of Trial Day 4, supra note 83, at 123, 125–26. 
105. Id. at 124. 
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had seen no sign of Halbach while he was there.  Brendan had 
been at the fire for only an hour or two and had left when it was 
still burning steadily.106 
Investigators left Dassey alone for several months after questioning him in 
November.  But in January of 2006, Kayla Avery, Dassey’s fifteen-year-old 
cousin, walked into Susan Brandt’s office at Mishicot High School.107  At the 
time, Brandt was interning at both the high school and Mishicot Middle School 
as part of completing her Master’s Degree in Counselor Education.108  
According to Brandt, Kayla entered her office and said she “was scared” 
because “her uncle, Steven Avery, had asked one of her cousins to help move 
a body.”109  The cousin to whom she was referring was, of course, Dassey.110   
That next month, specifically on February 20, 2006, Calumet County 
Investigators Mark Wiegert and Wendy Baldwin interviewed Kayla.111  During 
that interview, Kayla told investigators that Dassey was “acting up lately” and, 
in particular, that Dasey “would just stare into space and start crying, basically, 
uncontrollably.”112  She also relayed to investigators that, in her opinion, 
Dassey had recently lost approximately forty pounds.113 
Based on Kayla’s February 20 interview, Wiegert decided to question 
Dassey again.114  On Monday, February 27, 2006, Detective Wiegert and Tom 
Fassbender, a special agent with the Department of Justice Division of Criminal 
Investigation’s Special Assignments Bureau, pulled Dassey out of class at 
Mishicot High School to question him.115  The interrogation, which took place 
in a conference room at the school without a lawyer or guardian present, began 
at 12:30 p.m. and concluded at 2:14 p.m.116   
 
106. Brief of Defendant–Appellant, supra note 3, at 7.  Investigators presumably remained 
interested in Dassey given that Halbach’s bone fragments were found in a burn pit on the Avery 
property. Tufayel Ahmed, ‘Making a Murderer’ New Evidence: Teresa Halbach Was Alive After 
Meeting Steven Avery, Bobby Dassey Looked at Pictures of Mutilated Dead Women, Lawyers Say, 
NEWSWEEK (Oct. 24, 2017, 7:41 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/making-murderer-new-evidence-
teresa-halbach-steven-avery-bobby-dassey-691428 [https://perma.cc/F9MY-36FY]. 
107. Transcript of Trial Day 3 at 168, State v. Dassey, No. 06 CF 88 (Manitowoc Cty. Ct. 2007).  
108. Id. at 166–67. 
109. Id. at 169. 
110. Transcript of Trial Day 4, supra note 83, at 190. 
111. Id. at 189. 
112. Id. at 190. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Mishicot High School Interview, supra note 3, at 440. 
116. Id. at 440, 482. 
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The Making a Murderer Netflix documentary series did not feature or 
mention the schoolhouse interrogation, but the interrogation offers another 
example of how an attorney’s knowledge of the Reid interrogation technique 
can better inform Miranda-related arguments.  Whereas the November 6 
interrogation offered considerable insight into when a Reid interview shifts into 
a Reid interrogation, Wiegert and Fassbender on February 27 bypassed the 
interview steps and immediately began using Reid interrogation techniques.  
But only a knowledge of Reid would help the savvy defense attorney spot that 
what took place in that school conference room was hardly a “witness 
interview” as Wiegert would assert later.  
At the outset of the interrogation, Wiegert and Fassbender told Dassey that 
he was not under arrest, was free to leave, and did not have to answer their 
questions.117  Almost immediately thereafter, in the first two minutes, the 
detectives began relying on step two of the Reid technique (theme 
development)—justice for Teresa.118  The detectives were, moreover, 
confrontational with Dassey within those first two minutes.  Relying on Reid 
step one (direct confrontation), Fassbender asserts, “And I’m looking at you 
Brendan and I know you saw something and that’s what’s killing you more than 
anything else, knowing that Steven did this, it hurts.”119 
Further evidence of the Reid interrogation technique persists throughout the 
interrogation, including step six of Reid (dealing with a suspect’s passive 
mood).  Throughout the first portion of the interrogation, both detectives 
question Dassey extensively on whether he saw body parts in the bonfire he 
attended.120  Dassey first responds that he only saw a “garbage bag” but 
detectives push.121  As the interrogation continues, they encourage him to “be 
honest” and assure Dassey that they will “go to bat” for him.122  Wiegert further 
assures Dassey, “We’re not gonna run back and tell your grandma and grandpa 
what you told us or anything like that.”123  For more than twenty minutes, 
Dassey is largely nonresponsive to Wiegert and Fassbender’s persistent 
efforts.124  But the detectives break through a little more than halfway through 
the interrogation:  
WIEGERT: It’s not your fault.  Remember that.   
 
117. Id. at 440, 467. 
118. Id. at 440, 443. 
119. Id. at 442. 
120. Id. at 442–45. 
121. Id. at 442–43, 445, 454. 
122. Id. at 448. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 450–51. 
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FASSBENDER: Yeah, it’s not your fault . . . Like I said, Mark 
and I are not going to leave you high and dry.  I got a very, very 
important appointment at 3:00 today.  Well I ain’t leavin’ for 
the appointment until I’m sure you’re taken care of . . . telling 
the truth . . . get this off your chest and get it out in the 
open . . . so go ahead and talk to us about what you saw in the 
fire are killin’ you right now . . . what you see.  Go ahead, go 
ahead . . . you’ve got to do this for yourself.  I know you feel 
that it’s gonna hurt Steven, but it’s actually, actually gonna 
help Steven come to grips with what he needs to do . . .  You 
know we found some flesh in that fire too.  We know you saw 
some flesh.  We found it after all that burned.  I know you saw 
it . . .  Tell us.  You don’t have to worry about . . . you won’t 
have to prove that in court. (phone rings)  Tell us what you 
saw.  You saw some body parts . . .  You’re shaking your 
head . . . tell us what you saw . . . . 
BRENDAN:   . . .  
FASSBENDER:  You all right?  You all right?  What other 
parts did you see? 
BRENDAN:  Toes.125 
The remainder of the interrogation included additional statements from 
Dassey that minimally, to the minds of investigators, put him at or near the 
crime scene as or after it happened.  For example, Wiegert and Fassbender 
would get Dassey to admit that he saw some clothes “like a blue shirt, some 
pants.”126  They also get him to admit, after suggesting it to him, that there was 
blood on those clothes.127  For the first time, following two prior interactions 
with investigators, Dassey placed himself at or near the scene of Halbach’s 
death. 
Fassbender and Wiegert permitted Dassey to return to class at 2:14 p.m. 
when that interrogation ended.128  But at 3 p.m., Dassey returned to the school 
conference room.129  Wiegert and Fassbender would then take Dassey to the 
police station for another interrogation.130  
There is much to be concerned about with this first February 27 
interrogation.  Chief among those concerns is the investigators’ use of adult 
interrogation tactics on a juvenile with significant intellectual and social 
 
125. Id. at 451. 
126. Id. at 448. 
127. Id. at 449. 
128. Id. at 482. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
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limitations.131  Add to that the absence of a guardian during the interrogation. 
Even the Reid technique counsels that, in the case of juveniles, it’s best to 
involve the parents:  
Several states provide by statute that a youthful offender 
(juvenile) suspect cannot be interrogated unless one parent or 
guardian is present.  Under this requirement, the investigator 
should spend some time with the parent before questioning a 
son or daughter.  During this session, the investigator should 
take a positive approach and impress upon the parent that the 
only interest in talking to the youth is to ascertain the truth.  
The investigator should emphasize that he is just as much 
interested in establishing innocence as responsibility.132   
Still other concerns merit highlighting.  It might seem, by any measure, that 
Dassey was in custody for purposes of Miranda.  But recall that the 
interrogation began with Fassbender telling Dassey he was “free to leave,” not 
under arrest, and that he did not have to answer questions.  Lower courts often 
weigh those comments heavily in finding the particular interaction non-
custodial for Miranda purposes—no matter what happens afterward.133  
Although the question of whether Dassey was in custody during this 
schoolhouse interrogation was never litigated, a non-custody result would 
likely occur here unless the defense attorney educated the suppression court 
about the use of Reid.  Remember, Reid is designed to psychologically pressure 
the suspect and, accordingly, no reasonable person would feel free to leave 
during a Reid interrogation.   
Apart from Miranda custody concerns, why does this first February 27 
interrogation matter?  Dassey for the first time placed himself at the crime 
scene.  His involvement level, to the minds of investigators, was therefore 
subject to further investigation.  Relatedly, Fassbender and Wiegert learned that 
Dassey could be pressured into providing incriminating responses.  Whether 
they pressured him in good or bad faith in that school conference room (and in 
later interrogations) is irrelevant.  The point is that they learned Dassey could 
succumb—easily—to the Reid method.  Stated more simply, Wiegert and 
Fassbender realized in that first February 27 interrogation that the Reid method 
worked on Dassey.  That type of police discretion to use Reid on an 
unsophisticated juvenile suspect—if left unchecked by a defense attorney—is 
at once powerful and scary. 
 
131. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 23–24. 
132. INBAU ET AL., supra note 62, at 252. 
133. See, e.g., J. D. B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 264–65 (2011); Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 
403, 407 (Fla. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1169 (2011); United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 662 
(2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 369 (8th Cir. 1989). 
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In sum, the first February 27 interrogation demonstrates that knowledge of 
Reid could have clarified when Dassey was in custody for purposes of Miranda 
while countering investigator claims that what took place in that conference 
room constituted merely a “witness interview.”  
C. The February 27, 2006 Stationhouse Interrogation 
When the schoolhouse interrogation concluded, Wiegert and Fassbender 
permitted Dassey to return to his classes.  He specifically rejoined his Earth 
Science class, which he described to investigators as “about rock.”134  Dassey 
returned to the school conference room at 3 p.m. where Wiegert and Fassbender 
were waiting.135  They asked him and his mother, Barbara, who had arrived 
shortly after he returned to class, to accompany them to a nearby police station 
to participate in a videotaped interrogation.136  
That second February 27 stationhouse interrogation, which also went 
unexplored by the Netflix documentary, raises another set of unpreserved 
issues, largely focused on Miranda custody and waiver, for use in the law 
school classroom.137  Of course, had Dassey’s then lawyer had a firm 
understanding of the Reid interrogation technique, then perhaps he would have 
had a fuller range of preserved Miranda-related arguments to present in his 
Supreme Court petition.138  In any event, Fassbender and Wiegert took Brendan 
to the Two Rivers Police Station, which is roughly 7.7 miles from the high 
school.139  The interrogation began at 3:21 p.m. and lasted roughly forty-three 
minutes without a lawyer or guardian present.140  Although the officers later 
asserted that they asked Dassey’s mother whether she wanted to join him in the 
interrogation room, Barbara said they made no such offer.141  
Once there, Dassey for the first time received Miranda warnings, which he 
“waived” and began repeating to detectives his story that Avery tied up and 
stabbed Halbach.142  He again told Wiegert and Fassbender that he saw “girl 
 
134. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Mishicot High School Interview, supra note 3, at 481. 
135. Id. at 482. 
136. Id. at 482–83. 
137. Brief of Defendant–Appellant, supra note 3, at 38. 
138. Cf. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 17 (arguing only that Dassey’s 
confession was involuntary pursuant to the due process clause).  
139. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Mishicot High School Interview, supra note 3, at 482–83. 
140. Id. at 483; Transcript of Trial Day 5, supra note 3, at 7–8. 
141. Transcript of Trial Day 5, supra note 3, at 7; Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 2, 
at 69. 
142. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Two Rivers Police Dept. Interview, supra note 3, at 484, 492. 
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clothes” and there was some blood on them.143  He also again repeated that he 
saw body parts in the bonfire on the night of October 31.144 
But his story included new details unmentioned during the earlier 
schoolhouse interrogation.  In particular, he said that Avery stabbed Halbach in 
her stomach in what Dassey called her “jeep.”145  He added that Avery hid the 
knife under the seat and then tried to hide the jeep.146  He further relayed that 
Avery transported Halbach’s body to the bonfire fire pit using a snowmobile 
sled.147 
The new details of Dassey’s story also included more of his personal 
involvement.  When asked by Wiegert whether he helped Avery put anything 
in Avery’s garage after Halbach was killed, he admitted, “Yeah, ah, we took 
the silver cool ah, gray jeep and put it in the garage.”148  The interrogation ended 
at roughly 4:30 p.m.149 
Dassey, an intellectually challenged sixteen-year-old, was in custody at the 
Two Rivers Police Department.  That is, a reasonable person in Dassey’s 
position would not have felt as though he or she could terminate the 
stationhouse interrogation and leave.  To begin with, he entered an interrogation 
room setup according to the Reid technique.  He was seated in a straight-backed 
chair on the end furthest from the exit of a sparsely appointed room with the 
detectives seated between him and the single door.150  The room had nothing 
hung on the walls, was painted in a neutral color and included an observation 
mirror.151  Although the interrogation was recorded, both detectives entered 
with a file and a notepad for the ostensible purpose of taking notes. 
The decision to question Dassey in a precise and controlled setting was no 
accident.  Before commencing a Reid interrogation, the Reid method counsels 
investigators to set up a private soundproof room within the police station that 
is free from distractions and furnished sparsely with straight-backed chairs.152  
The room should also be equipped with a one-way observation mirror so that 
other detectives can evaluate the suspect’s “behavior symptoms.”153  Arranging 
 
143. Id. at 493–94. 
144. Id. at 488–90. 
145. Id. at 492. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 501. 
149. Transcript of Trial Day 5, supra note 3, at 7–8. 
150. Interrogation Photo 1, infra p. 803. 
151. Interrogation Photo 1, infra p. 803. 
152. INBAU ET AL., supra note 62, at 46–47. 
153. Id. at 47–48. 
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the room in this manner, according to Reid, isolates the suspect and removes 
the suspect from any familiar surroundings, thereby heightening the suspect’s 
anxiety while incentivizing the suspect to extricate himself from the 
situation.154  As the picture from his interrogation reflects, Wiegert and 
Fassbender followed Reid’s guidance to a tee. 
 
Interrogation Photo 1 
 
Once the stationhouse interrogation began, Wiegert and Fassbender pick 
up where the schoolhouse interrogation left off by relying on a previously 
unused step of the Reid interrogation technique.  Unlike the schoolhouse 
interrogation, where Wiegert and Fassbender were confrontational (step 1), 
sought to develop an interrogation theme (step 2) and handled Dassey’s denials 
(step 3), this interrogation largely relied on step 8—having the suspect orally 
relate various details of the offense.  Throughout the conversation, Wiegert and 
Fassbender frequently return to his story in order to test whether or not he will 
tell the same story.  During one sequence of fifteen pages of interview 
transcript, they push him to confirm his story three different times.155 
 
154. Id. at 46–47. 
155. Wiegert and Fassbender push Dassey to confirm details about the fire, how Teresa died, 
what Teresa’s car looked like, and his own involvement multiple times. Transcript of Brendan Dassey 
Two Rivers Police Dept. Interview, supra note 3, at 487–501.  For example, they asked, “When you 
say you saw her belly, how do you know it was her belly?” Id. at 489.  Shortly thereafter, they asked 
Dassey, “So just so I’m clear on this.  Where did he say that he stabbed her?” Id. at 496.  By way of 
final illustrative example, Wiegert and Fassbender asked, “You told me before that he, he told you that 
he stabbed her in the stomach.” Id. at 498. 
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But despite overwhelming evidence that Dassey was in custody at the 
stationhouse on February 27, Wiegert would testify during a hearing on his 
motion to suppress that what took place was merely a “witness interview.”156  
The prosecutor, Ken Kratz, had this exchange with Wiegert: 
Q: Describe for the Court the difference between a witness 
interview and a suspect interview if, in fact, there are any 
differences? 
A: Well, there’s several differences.  A witness interview, 
basically, is when a person is not in custody.  They’re free to 
leave.  They can stop answering questions at any time.  Um, 
they’re treated as somebody who may have information about 
a case.  Or a suspect interview, sometimes they’re not free to 
go.  Um, they’re sometimes, um, you know more information, 
you know that they’re involved in something, they’re treated 
as that you already know something has occurred and they are 
involved in it.  That’s the difference between the two.157 
Calling what took place a “witness interview” is good practice—for an 
investigator.  Left unchecked by the defense attorney untrained in Reid permits 
an officer (and therefore the prosecutor) to argue that every police–suspect 
conversation was merely a noncustodial interview.  That’s what happened here. 
Len Kachinsky, a lawyer who represented Dassey for a time prior to trial, 
conceded that what took place on February 27—even at the stationhouse—was 
not custodial interrogation.158  Although he received Miranda warnings prior to 
the February 27 stationhouse interrogation, that did little to alter the perception 
of the interrogation’s environment in the eyes of his lawyer.  Indeed, Kachinsky 
appeared to miss the custody issue because of his uniformed acceptance of 
Wiegert’s statement.  But even a casual understanding of Reid would have 
caused a reasonable defense attorney in similar circumstances to reject 
Wiegert’s characterization of the February 27 stationhouse interrogation as a 
“witness interview.” 
One other troubling legal issue arose during the February 27 stationhouse 
interrogation—whether Dassey actually waived his Miranda rights.  Neither 
the Supreme Court nor the Reid technique expressly considers the role of age 
or education in the Miranda waiver calculus.  
A waiver of Miranda rights, pursuant to Edwards v. Arizona “must not only 
be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment 
or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each 
 
156. Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 2, at 14–15. 
157. Id. at 14. 
158. Id. at 6–7. 
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case ‘upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, 
including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’”159 
For its part, the Reid technique advises that “the interrogation of juvenile 
suspects may be conducted in essentially the same way as for adults.”160  That 
interrogation process, per Reid, includes taking no special precautions when 
obtaining a Miranda waiver.  It is hard to blame the Reid method, though, given 
that the Supreme Court has not considered a juvenile interrogation case in 
nearly forty years.161  And Fare v. Michael C., in the context of waiver, 
expressly held back in 1979 that no reason existed to create a separate juvenile 
Miranda waiver standard—separate, that is, from the adult standard.162  Perhaps 
the Supreme Court would be more active in Miranda waiver jurisprudence if it 
knew that Reid, the most prominent interrogation method in the country, draws 
no distinction between adults and juveniles.  
In any event, Edwards is clear that a valid waiver “cannot be established 
by showing only that [the suspect] responded to further police-initiated 
custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.”163  But that’s 
precisely what happened in Dassey’s case.  At the outset of the February 27 
stationhouse interrogation, Wiegert read to Dassey his Miranda rights.164 After 
doing so, Wiegert added:  
WIEGERT:  *** No promises or threats have been made to me 
and no pressure of any kind has been used against me.  Do you 
agree with that? 
DASSEY:  Yeah. 
WIEGERT: You have to speak up a little bit. 
DASSEY:  Yeah. 
WIEGERT: Yes? 
DASSEY: Yes.  
WIEGERT: Then if you agree with making a statement, I need 
you to sign right there and if you wanna read it, you can read it 
there, (pause) Why don’t you put your initials here and put 
your initials here.  These are the two things I read to you. 
(pause)  OK, and I’m just going to put the place up here, Two 
Rivers Police Department, and the date is 2/27/06, and the time 
is approximately 3:21 p.m.  OK.  Let’s put that over there for 
now.  Um, Brendan, just a few things.  OK, we’re going to talk 
 
159. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981). 
160. INBAU ET AL., supra note 62, at 419. 
161. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979). 
162. Id.  
163. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. 
164. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Mishicot High School Interview, supra note 3, at 483. 
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about what you had initially told us earlier, OK.  Um, can you 
state your full name with middle initial and date of birth? 
DASSEY: Brendan Ray Dassey and then 10/19/ of 89.165 
Notice that Dassey answered only the question of whether Wiegert had 
made any promises or threats to him.  Dassey, however, at no point indicated 
that he understood his rights either individually or together.  That by itself is 
concerning, but particularly so for a suspect who, again was sixteen, suffered 
from speech and language impairment, received special education services, and 
scored in the low average to borderline disabled category on IQ tests.  
Dassey did not knowingly or voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and 
suggesting the contrary is a legal fiction.  The Court should revisit the question 
of whether an intellectually and socially challenged juvenile can properly waive 
Miranda pursuant to an adult waiver standard.  But its opportunity to do so is 
hardly a foregone conclusion; Dassey’s trial lawyer, after all, either waived or 
missed the issue.  In the interim, it falls on the defense bar to educate 
suppression courts that Reid’s failure to alter its nine-step technique for juvenile 
offenders reaches questions about the attachment of Miranda custody and the 
legitimacy of Miranda waiver.  
D. The March 1, 2006 Stationhouse Interrogation 
Of course, all of this—the two interrogations on February 27 and the one 
to come that night—builds to March 1, 2006, which again was at the center of 
Dassey’s Supreme Court petition.166  Thanks to episode three of Making a 
Murderer, which focused on the March 1 interrogation,167 the fame of Dassey’s 
confession grew far outside legal circles.168  Because of its notoriety, the March 
1 interrogation makes for a compelling teaching tool, particularly in four main 
 
165. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Two Rivers Police Dept. Interview, supra note 3, at 484. 
166. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13. 
167. Jethro Nededog, Everything You Need to Know About ‘Making a Murderer’ if You Don’t 
Want to Spend 10 Hours Watching, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 12, 2016, 6:32 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/netflix-making-a-murderer-recap-2016-8#-3 [https://perma.cc/P4E2-
BEWP]. 
168. See, e.g., Ashley Louszko et al., ‘Making a Murderer’: The Complicated Argument Over 
Brendan Dassey’s Confession, ABCNEWS (Mar. 8, 2016, 5:51 PM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/making-murderer-complicated-argument-brendan-dasseys-
confession/story?id=37353929 [https://perma.cc/2KZD-P7G7]; Jesse Singal, The Science Behind 
Brendan Dassey’s Agonizing Confession in Making a Murderer, THE CUT (Jan. 11, 2016), 
https://www.thecut.com/2016/01/science-behind-brendan-dasseys-confession.html 
[https://perma.cc/GW92-46SV]; Megan Willett, The Most Controversial Confession in ‘Making a 
Murderer’ Was Crazier than the Doc Reveals, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 7, 2016, 2:03 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/making-a-murderer-brendan-dassey-confession-2016-1 
[https://perma.cc/V89B-Y4AW]. 
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areas outside the voluntariness doctrine: Miranda custody, Miranda waiver, 
interrogation techniques, and the legal import sequential interrogations.  
But something strange happened before the March 1 confession.  When the 
stationhouse interrogation ended on February 27, 2006, at roughly 4:30 p.m., 
investigators made an interesting decision not to let him or his mother, Barbara, 
return home.169  Instead, Wiegert and Fassbender arranged for them to spend 
the night at the state’s expense under police guard at a hotel near the Two Rivers 
Police Station.170  Investigators, they said later, were concerned (1) about 
Dassey and Barbara’s safety, and (2) that the two might tamper with evidence 
if they went back home.171  Why those concerns dissipated on the night of 
February 28 is not clear.  Dassey even went to school the following day.172 
In any event, Wiegert and Fassbender paid a visit to Dassey at the hotel that 
night.173  They would interrogate him during an unrecorded session of an 
unknown length.  And something important happened that night: Dassey told 
Fassbender that he stained his pants with bleach as he helped clean Avery’s 
garage floor.174  Wiegert testified later that after those interrogations, he thought 
that Dassey might have been involved in disposing of Halbach’s body.175  The 
Reid method would counsel him to independently corroborate Dassey’s story.  
But that’s not what happened next. 
After a night at the hotel, Dassey and Barbara were released on February 
28.176  On the following day—March 1, 2006—Wiegert and Fassbender 
removed Dassey from his high school at 9:50 a.m.177  By 10:05 a.m., the trio 
left the high school to begin the 11.6 mile drive to the Manitowoc Sheriff’s 
Department.178  In-car audio captures the initial questioning, during which 
Dassey waives his Miranda rights.179  He also gives the investigators 
 
169. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Mishicot High School Interview, supra note 3, at 483. 
170. Id.  
171. Transcript of Trial Day 5, supra note 3, at 9–10. 
172. Transcript of Trial Day 7, supra note 21, at 45–46. 
173. Transcript of Trial Day 5, supra note 3, at 10–11. 
174. Id. at 11. 
175. Id.  Wiegert testified during direct examination at Dassey’s trial, “Well, obviously, when 
you keep learning little bits and pieces, Brendan keeps telling us a little more here, a little more there, 
we realized it could probably be either saw more, knew more, something.” Id.  
176. Motion to Suppress at 5, State v. Dassey, No. 06 CF 88 (Manitowoc Cty. Ct. 2006). 
177. Id. 
178. Id.  
179. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Manitowoc Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. Interview, supra note 3, at 
526. 
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permission to pick up the bleach-stained jeans that he referenced during the 
hotel interrogation.180  
Wiegert, Fassbender, and Dassey finally arrive at the police station at 
10:43 a.m.181  In classic Reid fashion,182 Wiegert and Fassbender let Dassey sit 
alone in the interrogation room for precisely five minutes.183  The videotaped 
interrogation begins at 10:56 a.m.184  Fassbender and Wiegert then proceed to 
interrogate Dassey for more than four hours without an attorney or 
parent/guardian present.  He confesses to raping Halbach and slitting her throat 
on his uncle’s instruction.185  
Statements from this March 1 interrogation become the evidentiary 
showpiece for the state at Dassey’s trial.  Investigators would never find 
physical evidence linking Dassey to Halbach’s murder.186  
1. Custody 
Contrary to Dassey’s early trial counsel’s concession that the March 1 
interrogation was non-custodial, Dassey was not free to leave at any time after 
investigators picked up from his high school—nor do they suggest otherwise to 
him.  Indeed, unlike prior interrogations where Wiegert and Fassbender tell 
Dassey he is “not under arrest” and “free to leave,” they offer no similar 
reassurances on March 1.  To the contrary, they take him from his school and 
transport him to a police interrogation room.  Rather than ask if Dassey will 
accompany them, Wiegert tells Dassey immediately after picking him up that 
he is going to answer questions.187  In doing so, he more than suggests to Dassey 
that his freedom is predicated on his willingness to answer the investigators’ 
questions:  
They’ve gotta nice quiet room there, there’s no kids running in 
 
180. Id. at 527–28. 
181. Motion to Suppress, supra note 176, at 5. 
182. INBAU ET AL., supra note 62, at 419 (“Prior to embarking upon the actual interrogation, it 
is advisable to allow the suspect to sit in the interview room alone for about five minutes.”). 
183. Wiegert and Fassbender enter the interrogation room at precisely the five-minute mark. 
Steven Avery & Brendan Dassey Cases, supra note 81. 
184. Id.  The interrogation footage is time-stamped.  
185. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Manitowoc Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. Interview, supra note 3, at 
570–74 (providing Dassey’s story about raping Halbach); id. at 586 (relaying Dassey confessing to 
cutting Halbach’s throat while she was still alive).  
186. Dassey v. Dittmann, 860 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that “the State had failed to 
find any physical evidence linking [Dassey] to the crime”), overruled on other grounds, 877 F.3d 297 
(7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).  
187. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Manitowoc Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. Interview, supra note 3, at 
527 (“All right, ah, so like I told you, we’re going to take a ride over to the a Manitowoc Sheriff’s 
Department”).  
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and out and stuff, so, and if you play it right, who knows, maybe 
we’ll get you back as soon as we can.  If we, we all get over 
there as soon as we can.188 
What makes the custody conclusion so straightforward, aside from the 
extended detention of a juvenile with significant intellectual and social  
limitations, is investigators’ thematic use, once again, of the Reid technique.  
We turn next to that use. 
2. The Reid method persists 
The investigators’ rampant misuse of the Reid method sets the March 1 
interrogation apart from its predecessors.  As mentioned, rather than follow 
Reid’s guidance to independently verify a suspect’s story,189 Wiegert and 
Fassbender in the limited interim time between the night of February 27 and the 
morning of March 1 do not obtain independent physical evidence to corroborate 
Dassey’s involvement in Halbach’s murder.  
Instead, throughout the March 1 interrogation, they rely on Reid step 1 
(confrontation) by asserting superior knowledge over Dassey, telling him at 
multiple points that they already know what happened.190  Borrowing from step 
2 (theme development), they also minimize Dassey’s involvement and reassure 
him that they’ll “stand behind” him.191  At one point, Fassbender goes so far as 
to say, “Um, from what I’m seeing, even if I filled those [gaps] in, I’m thinkin’ 
you’re all right.  OK, you don’t have to worry about things.”192  Wiegert also 
selectively relies on step 5 (retaining the suspect’s attention) by moving closer 
to Dassey, putting a hand on his knee and telling Dassey to be honest.193  The 
honest person, Wiegert assures him, is the one who gets the better deal.194  
Moreover, Weigert adds, it’s okay if Dassey helped his uncle, Steven Avery, 
kill Halbach as long as Avery was the one telling him to do it.195  Minimization 
 
188. Id. (emphasis added). 
189. INBAU ET AL., supra note 62, at 35 (“An investigation should be conducted in an objective 
manner and follow close guidelines with respect to proper interview and interrogation techniques, 
including reasonable efforts to corroborate confessions.”).  
190. E.g., Transcript of Brendan Dassey Manitowoc Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. Interview, supra note 
3, at 543 (“And you stopped now remember this is very important cuz we already know what happened 
that day, OK.”); id. at 547 (“We already know what happened.”); id. (“We already know what 
happened now tell us exactly.”). 
191. Id. at 541. 
192. Id. at 540.  
193. This occurs at approximately the 37:15 mark. Steven Avery & Brendan Dassey Cases, 
supra note 81. 
194. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Manitowoc Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. Interview, supra note 3, at 
541. 
195. Id. at 552. 
 
GALLINI, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 3 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/2019  9:32 AM 
810 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:777 
techniques like these impermissibly communicated to Dassey that he would 
receive more favorable treatment from the criminal justice system if he 
provided the factual account desired by investigators.196  
Aggressive use of powerful interrogation tactics also undermines the 
reliability and credibility of a suspect’s confession.197  Dassey’s story, given its 
evolution, is hard to credit.  Consider: in two prior interrogations on February 
27, he admits that he was present at the scene and that Avery stabbed 
Halbach.198  He repeats that story at the outset of the March 1 interrogation and 
again says “she was stabbed.”199  Somehow this morphs as the interrogation 
proceeds into Dassey saying that Avery cut off her hair,200 punched her,201 cut 
her,202 and shot her.203  His initial statement that Avery shot Halbach has 
garnered nationwide attention given that Wiegert is the one who first suggested 
to Dassey that a shooting occurred:   
WIEGERT: So Steve stabs her first and then you cut her neck? 
(Brendan nods “yes”) What else happens to her in her head? 
FASSBENDER: It’s extremely, extremely important you tell 
us this, for us to believe you. 
WIEGERT: Come on Brendan, what else? 
 
196. Minimization is generally considered an interrogation technique whereby the interrogator 
“minimizes the severity of the offense and ostensibly empathizes with the interrogee, characterizing 
the act as accidental, spontaneous, or otherwise justifiable by external factors.” Boaz Sangero & 
Mordechai Halpert, Proposal to Reverse the View of a Confession: From Key Evidence Requiring 
Corroboration to Corroboration for Key Evidence, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 511, 521 (2011).  
Psychologists have found through experimentation that use of minimizing techniques heightens the 
risk of a suspect confessing falsely. Melissa B. Russano et al., Investigating True and False 
Confessions Within a Novel Experimental Paradigm, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 481, 484 (2005) (“As 
predicted, both the minimization tactics and the offer of a deal led to increases in the rates of true and 
false confessions.”). 
197. See generally Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and 
Recommendations, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2010); Saul M. Kassin, Inside Interrogation: Why 
Innocent People Confess, 32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 525 (2009); Miller W. Shealy, Jr., The Hunting of 
Man: Lies, Damn Lies, and Police Interrogations, 4 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 21 (2014); 
Russell L. Weaver, Reliability, Justice and Confessions: The Essential Paradox, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
179 (2010). 
198. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Mishicot High School Interview, supra note 3, at 444, 452–
54, 458–59, 464–65; Transcript of Brendan Dassey Two Rivers Police Dept. Interview, supra note 3, 
at 487–88, 492, 496, 503–04. 
199. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Manitowoc Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. Interview, supra note 3, at 
559. 
200. Id. at 584. 
201. Id. at 585. 
202. Id. at 586. 
203. Id. at 587–88.  
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(pause) 
FASSBENDER: We know, we just need you to tell us. 
BRENDAN: That’s all I can remember. 
WIEGERT: All right, I’m just gonna come out and ask you. 
Who shot her in the head? 
BRENDAN: He did. 
FASSBENDER: Then why didn’t you tell us that?  
BRENDAN: Cuz I couldn’t think of it.204   
Collectively, tactics like this are reminiscent of language from Chief Justice 
Warren’s majority opinion in Miranda: “the very fact of custodial interrogation 
exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of 
individuals.”205  But it also reminds law schools more broadly that students of 
Reid would be able to identify both the tactics and when those tactics are used 
to improperly pressure defendants—even if inadvertently. 
3. Waiver 
There are also Miranda waiver problems preceding Dassey’s incriminating 
statements on March 1.  Immediately after picking Dassey up from his high 
school, Wiegert read Dassey his Miranda rights:   
Brendan, I’m just gonna to read you this form, it’s your 
Miranda Rights and then we’ll talk about that a little bit, OK?  
The law requires you be advised you of the following rights: 
? You have the right to remain silent 
? Anything you say can and will be used against you in 
court 
? You have the right to consult a lawyer and have him 
present with you while you’re being questioned.  If 
you cannot afford to hire an attorney, one will be 
appointed to represent you before any questioning.  
? You have the right to stop answering questions at any 
time.206  
The iteration of those Miranda warnings materially differs from the version 
Dassey received just days earlier on February 27.  At the outset of the 
stationhouse interrogation just days earlier, Wiegert provided the following as 
Dassey’s Miranda warnings: 
Before we ask you any questions you must understand your 
rights.  You have the right to remain silent.  Anything you say 
 
204. Id. at 587. 
205. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966).  
206. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Manitowoc Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. Interview, supra note 3, at 
526. 
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can be used against you in court.  You have the right to, you 
have the right to talk, to a lawyer for advice before we ask you 
any questions and have him with you during questioning.  You 
have this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even 
though you cannot afford to hire one.  We have no way of 
getting you a lawyer but one will be appointed for you if you 
wish and if and when you go to court.  If you wish to answer 
questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to 
stop answering questions any time.  You also have the right to 
stop answering questions at any time until you talk to a 
lawyer.207 
Although the Miranda Court itself made clear that no precise incantation is 
required,208 the differences between these two sets of warnings matter and they 
present wonderful learning opportunities for students.209  To begin with, 
although the prosecution never introduced the February 27 stationhouse 
interrogation into evidence against Dassey,210 the form of the Miranda warning 
on February 27, when compared to March 1, raises the compelling question of 
what constitutes a valid Miranda warning.  The February 27 warning is 
identical—word for word—to the warning approved by the Supreme Court’s 
1989 decision in Duckworth v. Eagan.211  
Although the warnings given in Duckworth and Dassey’s February 27 
stationhouse interrogation are the same, the suspects were not.  Unlike Dassey, 
the defendant in Duckwork was an adult.212  Accordingly, the Court did not have 
occasion to consider the impact of such a complex warning on a juvenile 
suspect with cognitive deficiencies.  That distinction more than matters.  
Scholars have written about juveniles’ inability to exercise or even 
understand their Miranda rights.213  Thomas Grisso, for example, studied 
 
207. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Two Rivers Police Dept. Interview, supra note 3, at 484. 
208. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490. 
209. Richard Rogers et al., The Comprehensibility and Content of Juvenile Miranda Warnings, 
14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 63, 68 (2008) (“With many juvenile offenders having limited verbal 
abilities and academic skills, the comprehensibility of juvenile Miranda warnings is essential.”).  
210. Transcript of Post-Conviction Motion Hearing Day 1, supra note 7, at 209, 214. 
211. 492 U.S. 195, 198 (1989).  
212. The opinion does not indicate the defendant’s age although a news article discussing the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Duckworth referred to the defendant as “a Chicago-area man.” Al Kamen, 
Police May Change Wording of Miranda Warning, Justices Say, WASH. POST (June 27, 1989), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/06/27/police-may-change-wording-of-
miranda-warning-justices-say/c345cf90-672f-43f8-b884-0dff371bfea2/ [https://perma.cc/4FPF-
7KDX]. 
213. E.g., Barry C. Feld, Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens When Cops Question Kids, 
23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 408–09 (2013).   
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juveniles’ exercise of Miranda rights for more than three decades.214  
Alarmingly, he learned that “[h]alf (55.3%) of juveniles, as contrasted with less 
than one-quarter (23.1%) of adults, did not understand at least one of the 
warnings and only one-fifth (20.9%) of juveniles, as compared with almost half 
(42.3%) of adults, grasped the entire warning.”215  Another study concluded that 
“[a]ccess to free legal services and the option to consult with a parent or 
guardian generally require at least a 10th-grade education.”216  And even if the 
juvenile understands the warning, juvenile suspects generally “do not fully 
appreciate the function or importance of rights, or view them as an entitlement, 
rather than as a privilege that authorities allow, but which they may unilaterally 
withdraw.”217 
With those studies in mind, the judiciary is justifiably concerned about the 
prospect of juvenile suspects both comprehending and exercising their Miranda 
rights.218  Various efforts to address those concerns exist.  Massachusetts, for 
example, follows the “interested adult” rule which enables a juvenile suspect to 
consult an interested adult to assist him or her with effectively understanding 
and exercising their rights.219  According to the Massachusetts Appeals Court, 
that rule exists because “most juveniles do not fully understand the significance 
of Miranda warnings when they hear them, and further, . . . juveniles often lack 
the capacity to fully appreciate the consequences of their actions.”220  
Alternative approaches to the interested adult rule include statutory or judiciary 
protections.221  
Putting aside those various approaches, no separate protections existed for 
Dassey to ensure that he understood his Miranda rights.  Rather, the acquisition 
of Dassey’s waiver ended in a manner similar to the February 27 stationhouse 
 
214. See Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 
68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1134 (1980). 
215. Feld, supra note 213, at 408–09 (citing Grisso, supra note 214, at 1152–54). 
216. Rogers, supra note 209, at 78. 
217. Feld, supra note 213, at 410. 
218. E.g., State ex rel. S.H., 293 A.2d 181, 184–85 (N.J. 1972) (describing the reading and 
explaining of Miranda rights to a ten-year-old “undoubtedly meaningless” as he would not have the 
capacity to fully understand his rights). 
219. Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 28 N.E.3d 1172, 1179 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015). 
220. Id. 
221. State v. Saldierna, 794 S.E.2d 474, 477 (N.C. 2016); see In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319, 326–
27 (Tex. 2008) (holding that a sixteen-year-old properly invoked his right to counsel when he stated 
he “wanted his mother to ask for an attorney”); United States v. Doe, 170 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 
1999) (holding that a juvenile’s parent must contemporaneously receive notice that the juvenile is in 
custody and of the juvenile’s Miranda rights); Lewis v. State, 288 N.E.2d 138, 141–42 (Ind. 1972), 
superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 1-1997 (codified as amended at IND. CODE § 31-32-5-1 (2018)) 
(requiring parents or guardians to be informed of a child’s rights). 
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interrogation.  Wiegert asked after providing the rights, “Do you know and 
understand each of these rights, your rights, which I have explained?”222  
Dassey replied only, “Yeah” and, like the February 27 stationhouse 
interrogation, immediately begins answering questions.223  As the Supreme 
Court made clear in Edwards v. Arizona, his doing so is problematic.224  Indeed, 
a suspect’s one word acknowledgement of the warnings followed by 
immediately beginning to answer questions does not reflect a voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent waiver.225  
Collectively, all three of these real-life examples—of Miranda custody, 
misused interrogation methods in action, and of Miranda waiver—provide rich 
sources for use and discussion in the investigative criminal procedure 
classroom.   
4. An unconsidered legal consequence  
Dassey’s age and background may matter in one other context: a 2004 
Supreme Court case called Missouri v. Seibert.226  In Seibert, Donald Rector 
and Jonathan Seibert died in a mobile home fire on February 12, 1997, in Rolla, 
Missouri.227  Five days after the fire, investigators interrogated Jonathan’s 
mother, Patrice, to determine her involvement in the fire.228  During the first of 
two interrogations, officers at the outset intentionally avoided giving Patrice 
her Miranda warnings.229  After Patrice made incriminating statements, 
including that “Donald was meant to die in the fire,” she received a twenty 
minute break, after which officers initiated a second interrogation.230  This time, 
 
222. Transcript of Brendan Dassey Manitowoc Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. Interview, supra note 3, at 
526. 
223. Id. at 526–27. 
224. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 480, 487 (1981). 
225. Id. at 484–85 (“[H]aving expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, 
[the accused] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made 
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or 
conversations with the police.”). 
226. 542 U.S. 600, 600 (2004). 
227. State v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 701 (Mo. 2002). 
228. Id. at 702. 
229. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604–05. 
230. Id. at 605. 
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however, Seibert received her Miranda warnings after which she repeated her 
incriminating statements.231 
A plurality of the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Seibert condemned the 
interrogators’ tactics.232  In doing so, it suppressed both Seibert’s first and 
second incriminating statements as the unconstitutional product of what the 
plurality called a “question first and warn later” approach.233  Yet the Court left 
open the prospect that statements obtained in other sequential confession cases 
could be admissible, noting that “when interrogators question first and warn 
later [we asked] whether it would be reasonable to find that . . . the warnings 
could function ‘effectively’ as Miranda requires.”234 
Seibert is frustratingly complex, but we can say this much: the Court 
disapproved of a particular two-step approach to Miranda.235  That is, the Court 
prohibited the practice of obtaining incriminating statements prior to giving the 
suspect Miranda warnings, administering Miranda warnings, and then 
obtaining those same statements.236  The question in Seibert was not whether 
the suspect’s unwarned incriminating statements were admissible—they were 
not—but rather whether the post-warning statements were separately 
admissible.237  Those statements, better known as the fruits of a Miranda 
violation, would ordinarily be admissible.238  Seibert therefore stands as an 
exception to the ordinary rule that administering Miranda warnings to a suspect 
suffices to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the unwarned 
statement.  
The question in a Seibert-like fact pattern is whether administration of 
midstream Miranda warnings is effective.239  To make that determination, the 
Seibert Court advised consideration of the following factors:  “(1) completeness 
and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, (2) 
the overlapping content of the two statements, (3) the timing and setting of the 
first and the second interrogations, (4) the continuity of police personnel, (4) 
the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as 
continuous with the first,” and (5) whether the police advised the suspect that 
her prior statement could not be used.240 
 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 614, 616–17. 
233. Id. at 611–12. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 612–14. 
236. Id. at 612–13. 
237. Id. at 604, 617. 
238. Id. at 614–15. 
239. Id. at 615. 
240. Id. at 615–16. 
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I have long wondered about Seibert as a tool to argue for suppression of 
Dassey’s March 1 statements.241  That is, to argue that his March 1 statements 
were the unconstitutional fruits of prior unwarned interrogations—in Dassey’s 
case, the first February 27 schoolhouse interrogation and, possibly, the hotel 
interrogation that took place that night.  Many of the Seibert factors are, after 
all, in play.  Among them, Wiegert and Fassbender clearly think on March 1 
that they are covering ground previously covered in prior interrogations, they 
make several references to their prior conversations, and Dassey repeats many 
of the exact same statements he initially offered in his first interview.  Although 
the time between interrogations is considerably longer than in Seibert, we are 
left to wonder about when the hotel interrogation occurred alongside what role 
age and educational background might play in an updated Seibert analysis.  Of 
course, the same two officers interrogated Dassey four times and, in doing so, 
they did not advise him that his statements at the schoolhouse on February 27 
could not be used against him. 
Admittedly, Seibert is an imperfect tool to reexamine the Dassey 
interrogations.  But two things are clear: first, Dassey’s case offers yet another 
dynamic illustration of Miranda doctrine for use in the classroom.  Second, the 
facts of his case have encouraged reconsideration of the due process 
voluntariness test for juveniles; there’s no reason it cannot do the same for other 
areas of the law like Miranda’s exclusionary rule.  
IV. 
There exists one other major reason—a reason aside from the 
interrogations, that is—for Dassey’s conviction: bad lawyering.  Section A 
explains Strickland v. Washington,242 one of the worst Supreme Court decisions 
in history.  Decided in 1984, Strickland governs what constitutes adequate 
defense representation pursuant to the Sixth Amendment.243  In doing so, it 
explores the story of William Tunkey—the attorney at the heart of the 
Strickland story.  Section B then considers five critical months where Leonard 
“Len” Kachinsky was appointed to represent Dassey.  It focuses on three main 
events: (1) Kachinsky’s decision to permit law enforcement to interrogate 
Dassey outside of Kachinsky’s presence on May 13, 2006; (2) reliance on an 
outside defense “expert” who sought to induce a confession from Dassey; and 
 
241. I do not think I am alone in this curiosity.  Dassey’s post-conviction lawyers hinted during 
the hearing on Dassey’s habeas motion that the February 27 and March 1 interrogations could be 
related.  Len Kachinsky, Dassey’s lawyer for the motion to suppress, was asked whether he thought 
the February 27 interrogation “would impact the legality or the admissibility of the March 1 statement.” 
Transcript of Post-Conviction Motion Hearing Day 1, supra note 7, at 215.  Kachinsky replied that 
“the intervening events were so strong that any spillover or prejudice was probably nonexistent.” Id.  
242. See infra notes 247–76 and accompanying text. 
243. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686–87 (1984).  
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(3) Kachinsky’s concession as part of his motion to suppress that Dassey was 
not in custody for purposes of Miranda during any of his interrogations.  
Section B makes the sad but perhaps obvious conclusion that Kachinsky is 
today’s William Tunkey. 
To illustrate Strickland’s inability to demand more from the defense bar, 
Section C reviews the upsetting state appellate judiciary’s analysis of 
Kachinksy’s deplorable defense representation.  The conclusion by two 
different state courts that Kachinsky provided constitutionally adequate 
representation masks a powerful reality: meaningful change to the expectations 
of defense lawyers lies in the hands of law schools—and law professors—
nationwide.  Section C contends that where the Supreme Court has failed, law 
schools must succeed.  That is, law schools must ignore the low bar set by 
Strickand in favor of demanding more from students. Kachinsky’s conduct 
reveals the potentially disastrous consequences should law schools not accept 
this challenge. 
A. A Primer on Attorney Performance 
Put candidly, little is required for a defense attorney to be characterized as 
constitutionally competent.  The source for judging defense attorney 
effectiveness stems from the Sixth Amendment, which provides, “In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”244  Despite numerous Supreme Court 
right-to-counsel holdings indicating when an indigent defendant qualifies for 
an attorney at the state’s expense, the law prior to 1984 was unclear on how that 
attorney delivered constitutionally satisfactory criminal defense representation.  
For example, neither Gideon v. Wainwright,245 nor Douglas v. California246—
both of which provided indigent defendants with appointed counsel at different 
procedural stages—says anything about the minimum quality of attorneys 
appointed to represent clients during those procedural events.  
The Supreme Court, for its part, admitted that the issue presented when it 
accepted Strickland v. Washington in 1983 was novel.247  In 1984, when 
Strickland was decided, the Court held that a defendant receives 
constitutionally unacceptable representation when (1) counsel’s representation 
falls below an objective standard of reasonableness that (2) prejudiced the 
defense, and therefore had an effect on the judgment.248 
 
244. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
245. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
246. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
247. Docket, Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (No. 82-1554); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 
248. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
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As the years since Strickland have overwhelmingly demonstrated, the bar 
set by the Supreme Court for defense lawyering is low.  That lower courts do 
not expect much from defense attorneys is unsurprising given that Strickland 
itself approved of alarming defense attorney behavior.  Indeed, the lawyer in 
Strickland, William Tunkey, failed his client, David Washington, in several 
ways.  Washington, who was facing the death penalty, embarked on a ten-day 
crime spree in 1976 that included three murders.249  At the time he represented 
Washington, Tunkey was a private attorney with considerable criminal 
experience.250  But things went south very early in their professional 
relationship after Washington ignored Tunkey’s advice not to speak with police 
and confessed to two of the killings.251  Although Tunkey initially filed several 
suppression motions on behalf of Washington, he abandoned those motions in 
dramatic fashion on the day Washington changed his pleas to guilty.252  Similar 
to Kachinsky, Tunkey expressly waived some of Washington’s best issues, 
telling the court that, as to his Miranda-related waiver arguments, “it is my 
considered judgment that there was a free and voluntary waiver of counsel in 
each case.  There was a waiver of his various constitutional rights to remain 
silent, to the assistance of counsel, et cetera.”253 
By the time of Washington’s sentencing hearing just five days later, Tunkey 
would admit, “I had a hopeless feeling.  There is no question about that.”254  He 
added, “I can honestly say that I don’t know that I felt that there was anything 
which I could do which was going to save David Washington from his fate.”255  
As a result of those emotions, Tunkey did not request a continuance from the 
court to give him additional time to prepare.256  He also did not request a 
presentence report and otherwise did little to save Washington’s life.257  He 
submitted a sentencing memorandum that spanned just five pages, cited no 
cases, and conceded the applicability of two aggravating circumstances.258  
Tunkey then did not put on a case at the sentencing hearing itself, choosing 
instead to rely on his sentencing memorandum and testimony from Washington 
 
249. Id. at 671–72. 
250. Id. at 672. 
251. Id. 
252. Id.  
253. Joint Appendix at 23, Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (No. 82-1554). 
254. Id. at 384. 
255. Id. at 400. 
256. Id. (“As far as the time between the entry of the plea and affirmatively and aggressively 
moving for a continuance really occurred to me.”). 
257. Id. at 405. 
258. Id. at 332–37. 
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at the change of plea hearing.259  As the sentencing process unfolded, Tunkey 
never had Washington—who had no prior criminal record—examined by a 
psychologist or psychiatrist.260  At a hearing on Washington’s subsequent 
federal habeas petition, Tunkey testified that his decision not to seek a 
presentence report was a “lack of forethought” and was not “a matter of trial 
strategy.”261 
Yet the Supreme Court upheld Tunkey’s abysmal representation of 
Washington as constitutionally adequate.262  Writing for a majority of the Court, 
Justice O’Connor in Strickland v. Washington announced a new two-part 
standard for judging the reasonableness of a defense attorney’s 
representation.263  First, said the Court, a defendant must show that counsel’s 
performance was “deficient.”264  That, in turn, “requires showing that counsel 
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”265  
In addressing how to evaluate when counsel falls below an objective 
performance threshold, the Court indicated that “prevailing professional 
norms” help.266  Citing American Bar Association standards as an example, the 
Court noted that counsel must maintain the duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid 
conflicts, a duty to advocate the defendant’s cause, and a duty to “bring to bear 
such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing 
process.”267  The standard is, however, “highly deferential” and, accordingly, 
“a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within 
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must 
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 
‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”268 
Second, the defendant must provide “prejudice”; that is, “that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.”269  The prejudice standard, a challenging 
one to satisfy, “requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”270  Stated 
 
259. Id. at 101, 313.  
260. Id. at 384–85. 
261. Id. at 405. 
262. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 670, 699, 701 (1984).  
263. Id. at 687.  
264. Id. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. at 688. 
267. Id. (citations omitted). 
268. Id. at 689 (citation omitted). 
269. Id. at 687. 
270. Id. 
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differently, the Court wrote, prejudice requires a defendant to demonstrate “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.”271 
After explaining the new law, the Court turned its attention to applying the 
two-part standard to Tunkey’s representation of Washington.  Justice O’Connor 
for the majority brazenly commented that it “is not difficult in this case” to 
conclude “that the conduct of respondent’s counsel at and before respondent’s 
sentencing proceeding cannot be found unreasonable.”272  As to the first prong, 
the Strickland Court held that Tunkey’s performance was objectively 
reasonable.  Although it conceded that Tunkey felt “hopeless,” Justice 
O’Connor wrote that “nothing in the record indicates . . . that counsel’s sense 
of hopelessness distorted his professional judgment.”273 
“[T]he lack of merit of [Washington’s] claim is even more stark,” wrote the 
Court about the prejudice prong.274  Any evidence that Tunkey failed to present 
at the sentencing hearing, the Court reasoned, “would barely have altered the 
sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge.”275  But more to the point, 
said the Court, the evidence of Washington’s guilt was so overwhelming that 
no level of attorney incompetence could create the requisite prejudice.276 
In many ways, the story of how the judiciary evaluated Len Kachinsky’s 
representation of Brendan Dassey is merely another chapter in a long and sad 
book of intolerable defense representation that Strickland views as 
constitutionally acceptable. 
B. Kachinsky’s Representation 
Len Kachinsky was appointed to represent Dassey on March 7, 2006.277 
Kachinsky replaced Ralph Sczygelski who withdrew just hours following 
 
271. Id. at 694. 
272. Id. at 698. 
273. Id. at 699. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. at 700. 
276. Id. (“Given the overwhelming aggravating factors, there is no reasonable probability that 
the omitted evidence would have changed the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating circumstances and, hence, the sentence imposed.”). 
277. Dassey v. Dittmann, 201 F. Supp. 3d 963, 975 (E.D. Wis. 2016), overruled by 877 F.3d 297 
(7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).  Manitowoc County Circuit Judge Jerome Fox, who presided over Dassey’s 
case, signed the appointment, which originated from the Office of the State Public Defender. John Lee, 
Kachinsky to Represent Dassey, POST CRESCENT (Jan. 7, 2016, 6:13 PM), 
https://www.postcrescent.com/story/news/local/steven-avery/2016/01/07/kachinsky-represent-
dassey/78437970/ [https://perma.cc/3VJ4-8NMV].  Kachsinky was on a list maintained by the state 
public defender of private attorneys certified to accept criminal cases involving indigent defendants. 
See WIS. ADMIN. CODE PD § 2.06 (May 2010).  The Wisconsin legislature vests discretion in the 
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Dassey’s initial appearance upon learning that he, Sczygelski, was a distant 
relative of Halbach.278  At the time of his appointment, Kachinsky boasted that 
he “served as a prosecutor or defense counsel in more than 250 jury trials, and 
represented clients in more 350 appeals in state and federal courts.”279 
But that experience, even if accurate, hardly translated into zealous 
advocacy.  Kachinsky did not meet with Dassey until March 10—three days 
after his appointment—though he did find time to speak with the media.280  In 
one of several interviews Kachinsky gave before even meeting Dassey or 
reviewing the interrogation tapes, Kachinsky was quoted as saying, “We have 
a 16-year-old who, while morally and legally responsible, was heavily 
influenced by someone that can only be described as something close to evil 
incarnate.”281  In another interview, he thought he was “stating the obvious” by 
indicating that Dassey would be convicted based on the content of his 
confession.282  Indeed, at the time Kachinsky made those statements, he had 
only seen the criminal complaint.283  In those early days, as he gave numerous 
interviews, he meanwhile did very little on Dassey’s case—logging just a few 
case-related phone calls.284 
After finally meeting with Dassey for roughly an hour on March 10, 
Kachinsky promptly gave yet another interview in which he said that Dassey 
was “sad, remorseful, and overwhelmed by the charges against him.”285  He 
also commented at that time that he was not ruling out a guilty plea.286  When 
asked later why he gave so many interviews, Kachkinsky commented:  
I knew that Brendan’s family was watching these news casts, 
and so in effect in some ways it was a message that was, um, 
sent to them, uh, to try to get them accustomed to the idea that 
Brendan might take a legal option that they don’t like and try 
to explain why he would do that and, perhaps, to cut down on 
 
public defender to assign cases to private counsel on an as-needed basis. WIS. STAT. § 977.08(3)(f) 
(2017–2018). 
278. Lee, supra note 277.   
279. Id.  Kachinsky’s claims aside, he graduated from the University of Wisconsin Law School 
in 1978. Transcript of Post-Conviction Motion Hearing Day 1, supra note 7, at 113.  He served as a 
JAG officer for four years after which he entered private practice but remained in the Army Reserve. 
Id.  He retired from the Army Reserve in July 2007. Id. 
280. Transcript of Post-Conviction Motion Hearing Day 1, supra note 7, at 114. 
281. Id. at 116 (emphasis added). 
282. Id. at 122–23. 
283. Id. at 123. 
284. Id. at 126. 
285. Id. at 131. 
286. Id. at 134. 
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possible interference from his family.287 
After meeting with Dassey on March 10, Kachinsky continued to make the 
media rounds.  Although Dassey during their meeting asserted his innocence, 
Kachinsky for the next several days did no work on Dassey’s case.288  He 
instead talked to local reporters, Court TV, and Dateline NBC.289 
Dassey made an appearance in court on March 17—the same day 
Kachinsky appeared on The Nancy Grace show.290  While on that show, he told 
viewers that if the confession was accurate, “there is, quite frankly, no 
defense.”291  But Kachinsky, at the time of that statement, still had not reviewed 
Dassey’s statements to law enforcement.292  Kachinsky’s commitment to the 
press continued in the days that followed; he had more conversations with 
Dateline and other assorted local media.293  Meanwhile, Kachinsky had to this 
point taken no action on Dassey’s comment during their March 10 meeting that 
his March 1 statement was inaccurate and that he wanted to take a polygraph to 
prove it.294  Moreover, although the prosecution made discovery available to 
Kachinsky, he did not make copies of all available material because, in his 
words, he could not see “any use” for it.295  
By March 25, Kachinsky made limited time to listen to some of the March 
1 interrogation.296  Without the benefit of consulting an interrogation expert, he 
characterized the methods employed by investigators as “pretty standard and 
quite legitimate.”297  In Kachinsky’s opinion, the investigators on February 27 
and March 1 took “great pains to try to make the details in that interview come 
out from—from Brendan and not something that was suggested by them.”298 
In any event, additional media appearances ensued during the following 
days, though little work on Dassey’s case was done.  On March 30, for example, 
Kachinsky’s entire work on the Dassey case consisted of a single email 
exchange with a local reporter.299  Then, on March 31, his workday comprised 
of two emails with a local reporter followed by an interview with a separate 
 
287. Id. at 136–37. 
288. See id. at 139. 
289. Id. at 139–41. 
290. Id. at 141–42. 
291. Id. at 142.  
292. Id. at 144–45. 
293. Id. at 150, 153. 
294. Id. at 152. 
295. Id. at 156. 
296. Id. at 163. 
297. Id. at 170–71.  
298. Id. at 176.  
299. Id. at 173–74. 
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local television station.300  The April 2 workday was comprised of Kachinsky 
sending a single email to the press and having a phone conference with a 
television reporter.301  During one interaction with the press, Kachinsky said 
that “Brendan has a reasonably good ability to recall events he participated 
in.”302  In total, over roughly the first three weeks of representing Dassey, 
Kachinsky would spend at least ten hours communicating with the press but 
just one hour with his client.303  Meanwhile, Kachinsky communicated to 
Dassey that his chances of winning a motion to suppress the March 1 confession 
“were not terribly good.”304 
Kachinsky next saw Dassey in person on April 3.305  The pair met together 
for roughly an hour and fifteen minutes, during which time Dassey made a 
second request to take a polygraph exam.306  Apparently in an effort to fulfill 
Dassey’s request, Kachinsky looked up polygraph examiners on the internet 
and, without looking into his background, contacted a man named Michael 
O’Kelly.307  Kachinsky then wrote a letter to Dassey indicating that he had 
identified a polygraph examiner, but he added:  
But, once again, the videotape is pretty convincing that you 
were being truthful on March 1.  You need to stop thinking 
about who benefits from what you say and just think about 
what really happened. 
 
If a judge or jury thinks you are lying, cover up for Steve or 
yourself, you are writing yourself a sentence to life 
imprisonment without parole. 
 
If you accept responsibility for what you did and cooperate in 
Steve’s case, at least one of the Halbachs will ask Judge Fox to 
go relatively easy on you.308 
Kachinsky’s pattern of talking to the press while performing little work on 
Dassey’s case continued.309  He did little to review available discovery,310 had 
 
300. Id. at 174. 
301. Id. at 182. 
302. Id. at 183. 
303. Id. at 183. 
304. Id. at 177. 
305. Id. at 183.  
306. Id. at 185–86.  
307. Id. at 187–88. 
308. Id. at 189–90. 
309. Id. at 191.  
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not retained his own investigator,311 and did not focus on statements Dassey 
made other than what he said on March 1.312  
On April 16, O’Kelly performed a polygraph examination on Dassey.313  
Although the results were inconclusive,314 O’Kelly nonetheless relayed to 
Kachinsky that he thought Dassey “was a kid without a conscience.”315  Despite 
O’Kelly’s view of Dassey and despite Dassey’s claims of innocence, Kachinsky 
elected to hire O’Kelly as his investigator,316 and the pair worked together to 
get Dassey to cooperate with the prosecution.317  Kachinsky filed a motion to 
suppress on Dassey’s behalf on April 19, arguing only that Dassey’s statements 
on March 1 were involuntary; he made no Miranda-related arguments.318 
To bolster their efforts to have Dassey cooperate with the prosecution, 
Kachinsky decided to have O’Kelly re-interview Dassey.319  Kachinsky’s goal, 
he hoped, was to have O’Kelly develop information that would be helpful to 
the prosecution.320  Doing so, Kachinsky thought, would both make clear to 
Dassey that a jury would find him guilty and, as a result, pleading guilty was 
the only appropriate path forward.321  Kachinsky set May 12 as the date for 
O’Kelly to interview Dassey.322  On that date, Kachinsky thought, Dassey 
would be particularly vulnerable because he anticipated losing the motion to 
suppress.323  
The suppression hearing occurred on May 9.  Before the substance of the 
hearing commenced, Kachinsky conceded that Dassey was not in custody either 
during the February 27 stationhouse interrogation or the March 1 stationhouse 
interrogation.324  (The November 6, 2006 roadside interrogation and the other 
two February 27 interrogations all went unmentioned.)  Kachinksy specifically 
told the court: 
[B]ased on the review of those [March 1] tapes, uh, and the 
 
311. Id. at 193.  
312. Id. at 209. 
313. Id.  
314. Id. at 210. 
315. Id. at 212. 
316. Id. at 213.  
317. Dassey v. Dittmann, 201 F. Supp. 3d 963, 977 (E.D. Wis. 2016), overruled by 877 F.3d 297 
(7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
318. Motion to Suppress, supra note 176, at 6–9. 
319. Dassey, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 977. 
320. Id.  
321. Id.  
322. Id. 
323. Id.  
324. Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 2, at 6–7. 
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transcripts, and also consultations with my client, investigator, 
and other witnesses, uh, the question of whether or not this is 
a custodial interrogation is not, uh, at issue in this case.  It’s not 
a custodial, uh, interrogation, although, the, uh, giving of the 
Miranda rights, or failure to do the same during portions of the, 
uh, statements, would be relevant in determining 
voluntariness.325 
The court replied, “So -- so, Miranda warnings are not an issue, or 
Mirandizing is not an issue here, neither is the -- the custodial or noncustodial 
nature of the-- of the -- of the, uh, interviews.  All right.”326  
After the hearing, O’Kelly sent an email to Kachinsky on May 9 
condemning the Avery family.327  He wrote in part that the Averys “are 
criminals” and that he could “find no good in any member.”328  As for the 
upcoming Dassey interview, he advised Kachinsky not to attend: 
I think that your visit will be counterproductive to our goals for 
Brendan. . . .  Brendan needs to be alone.  When he sees me 
this Friday I will be a source of relief.  He and I can begin to 
bond.  He needs to trust me and the direction that I steer him 
into.  Brendan needs to provide an explanation that coincides 
with the facts/evidence.  
 
I would like to obtain his confession this Friday.  Brendan 
should provide details of the crime scene and data that has been 
previously undisclosed that mirrors the crime scene data.329 
Kachinsky replied that he would not attend and, as he predicted, the court 
denied his suppression motion on May 12.330  
O’Kelly then proceeded to videotape an interview of Dassey in a room at 
the detention center where Dassey was held.331  O’Kelly began by presenting 
Dassey with a variety of pictures, images, and props.332  O’Kelly, for example, 
showed Dassey photos of Halbach, the Avery property, a photo of Halbach’s 
church, and a missing person poster for Halbach.333  He then told Dassey that 
 
325. Id. at 6. 
326. Id. at 7. 
327. E-mail from Michael J. O’Kelly, Private Investigator, to Len Kachinsky, Defense Counsel, 
Sisson and Kachinsky Law Office (May 9, 2006, 10:11 PM). 
328. Id.  
329. Id.  
330. Id. 
331. Dassey v. Dittmann, 201 F. Supp. 3d 963, 977 (E.D. Wis. 2016), overruled by 877 F.3d 297 
(7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
332. Id. at 977–78. 
333. Id. 
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Dassey’s polygraph results indicated “deception,” though Dassey was confused 
and replied, “That I passed it?”334  Once Dassey realized that he failed, O’Kelly 
confronted Dassey and said, “The two things I don’t know is, are you sorry for 
what you did and will you promise not to do it again.  Those are the two things 
I don’t know.  I know everything else that I need to about this case except for 
those two things. . . .  Are you sorry?”335  
Dassey maintained his innocence for the first portion of the interview.336  
But O’Kelly continued to press him.  He threatened Dassey that, unless he was 
sorry, he would spend the rest of his life in prison.337  Dassey’s story began to 
evolve into a story similar to what he told investigators on March 1, though 
portions of the timeline Dassey provided on March 1 had changed.338  
Regardless, at the interview’s conclusion, O’Kelly believed that Dassey was 
“on board with cooperating in the Avery prosecution and, ultimately, entering 
a plea agreement.”339  Although Kachinsky never watched O’Kelly’s interview, 
he permitted O’Kelly to speak with investigators about what Dassey said during 
their private interview.340  
After the O’Kelly interview, Kachinsky scheduled a “free interview” for 
the state on May 13.341  The strategy, according to Kachinsky, was for Dassey 
to provide missing evidence that would help with the Avery prosecution.342  
With no immunity or other consideration discussed, Kachinsky specifically 
arranged for the state to interrogate Dassey again—without Kachinsky 
present.343  Kachinsky moreover had no discussion with the prosecution before 
the interrogation “about the admissibility or future use” of the use of Dassey’s 
statement.344  And in his place, Kachinsky left O’Kelly to supervise Dassey’s 
interrogation from a separate room, although Kachinksy told O’Kelly not to 
interrupt the interrogation unless Dassey asked for it to stop.345 
 
334. Id. at 978. 
335. Id.; Transcript of Post-Conviction Motion Hearing Day 2 at 16, State v. Dassey, NO. 06 CF 
88 (Manitowoc Cty. Ct. 2010). 
336. Dassey, 201 F.Supp. 3d at 978. 
337. Id.; Transcript of Post-Conviction Motion Hearing Day 2, supra note 335, at 18. 
338. Dassey, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 978. 
339. Id. 
340. Id.; Transcript of Post-Conviction Motion Hearing Day 2, supra note 335, at 31. 
341. Transcript of Post-Conviction Motion Hearing Day 2, supra note 335, at 34. 
342. Id. at 36; E-mail from Len Kachinsky, Defense Counsel, to Tom Fassbender, Special Agent, 
Wisconsin Dept. of Justice (May 12, 2006, 9:19 PM). 
343. Transcript of Post-Conviction Motion Hearing Day 2, supra note 335, at 36–37. 
344. Id. at 37–38. 
345. Id. at 38–39. 
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Wiegert and Fassbender again led the May 13 interrogation, which they 
began by advising Dassey of his Miranda warnings.346  The pair again sought 
to have Dassey tell them what happened to Halbach on October 31, 2005.347  As 
Dassey relayed the details, many of them differed from the story he told on 
March 1.348  He, for example, changed his story on a number of key issues, 
including about whether he cut Halbach’s hair, shot her, cut her throat, and 
seeing Halbach’s personal items in a burn barrel.349  
Wiegert and Fassbender grew frustrated.  They told him they would leave 
the room if Dassey would not tell the truth.350  When that threat proved 
unproductive, Wiegert took a different approach.  Wiegert told Dassey that his 
mother would be upset to learn that Dassey was being untruthful with him.351  
He specifically commented, “I haven’t called her yet to tell her that you lied to 
me, but I will do that, what do you think she’s gonna say to you?  She’s gonna 
be mad.”352  Knowing that jail calls were recorded, Wiegert then suggested to 
Dassey that he call his mother so she could hear the truth directly from him.353  
Dassey agreed,354 though Kachinsky knew nothing about it.355 
When Dassey called his mother, Barbara Janda, from jail later that day, 
their call was indeed recorded.356  Dassey told Janda at the outset that “Mark & 
Fassbender are gonna talk to you.”357  He proceeded to tell her “that Mike guy 
came up here and talked to me about my results.”358  In discussing what “Me & 
Steven did that day,”359 he said, “Mike & Mark & Matt came up one day and 
took another interview with me and said because they think I was lying but so, 
they said if I came out with it that I would have to go to jail for 90 years.”360  
 
346. Transcript of Calumet Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. Interview of Brendan Dassey at 757–58, State 
v. Dassey, No. 06 CF 88 (Manitowoc Cty. Ct. May 13, 2006). 
347. See id. at 759.  
348. The district court relayed in detail how Dassey’s May 13, 2006, story compares to the one 
he told on March 1, 2006. Dassey v. Dittmann, 201 F. Supp. 3d 963, 979–80 (E.D. Wis. 2016), 
overruled by 877 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
349. Transcript of Post-Conviction Motion Hearing Day 2, supra note 335, at 41–43. 
350. Transcript of Calumet Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. Interview of Brendan Dassey, supra note 346, 
at 764. 
351. Id. at 792–93. 
352. Id. at 793. 
353. See id. at 822–23. 
354. Id. at 823. 
355. Transcript of Post-Conviction Motion Hearing Day 2, supra note 335, at 45. 
356. Phone Call Brendan & Mom, supra note 23, at 1. 
357. Id. 
358. Id.  
359. Id. at 2. 
360. Id.  
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But, he added, “if I come out with it I would probably get I dunno about like 20 
or less.”361  Janda asked later, “Was your attorney there when Mark and those 
guys were?”362  When Dassey replied, “No,” Janda advised him to stop talking 
and added, “They are putting you in places where you’re not.”363  She 
insightfully added, “what your attorney should be doing is putting an order on 
all of them that they cannot interfere with you or your family members unless 
your attorney is present.”364 
Months later, on August 14, 2006, the State Public Defender’s office sent 
Kachinsky a letter.365 It read, in part, as follows:  
[Director of the Assigned Counsel Division, Deborah Smith] 
is recommending that you be decertified from the Class A 
felony appointment list and the Trial 3, Class B–D felony list.  
Her recommendation is based on your failure to provide 
competent representation in the Brendan Dassey case.  You 
have confirmed to her that you allowed law enforcement to 
interview your client on May 13, 2006 in your absence.  
You’ve confirmed to her that you were not present at the 
interview on May 13, 2006 because you had to attend army 
reserve training that weekend.  It is difficult to imagine a 
situation when it would be appropriate to allow a client in a 
serious felony case to give a statement in the attorney’s 
absence.  To allow such an interview in this case is 
indefensible.366 
The letter further notified Kachinsky that he would no longer be appointed 
to Class A felony cases.367  A copy of the letter was also provided to the trial 
judge, Jerome Fox, and Kachinsky filed a motion to withdraw as counsel.368  
Judge Fox conducted a hearing on Kachinsky’s motion on August 25.369  
Kachinsky’s “failure to be present while his client gave a statement to 
investigators,” said the court at the hearing, “constituted deficient performance 
 
361. Id.  
362. Id. at 7.  
363. Id. 
364. Id.  
365. Transcript of Motion Hearing at 4–5, State v. Dassey, No. 06 CF 88 (Manitowoc Cty. Ct. 
Aug. 25, 2006). 
366. Id. at 4. 
367. Id. at 5. 
368. Id. at 5–6. 
369. Id. at 1. 
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on Attorney Kachinsky’s part.”370  The court therefore granted Kachinsky’s 
motion.371 
C. Len Kachinsky Is the New William Tunkey 
The parallels between William Tunkey and Len Kachinsky cannot be 
ignored.  Tunkey, you’ll recall, admitted to feeling “hopeless” about David 
Washington’s case and likewise admitted that much of his efforts did not 
qualify as sound trial strategy.372  Whereas Tunkey’s expression of 
hopelessness was both overt and open, Kachinsky’s display of hopelessness 
was more tacit.  Kachinsky’s entire strategy, after all, was designed to have 
Dassey plead guilty and assist the prosecution.373  Though perhaps more veiled, 
Kachinsky’s representation was just as damaging to Dassey’s case as Tunkey’s 
decision-making was to Washington.  
A handful of other strikingly similar parallels between the two attorneys 
exist.  Consider: both Tunkey and Kachinsky conceded viable Miranda-related 
issues,374 and neither Tunkey nor Kachinsky secured subject-specific experts to 
assist their clients.  In David Washington’s case, Tunkey did not seek a 
psychiatric or psychological evaluation for Washingon.  To the contrary, 
Tunkey self-assessed Washington as “sane.”375  But in Tunkey’s post-
conviction hearing testimony, he admitted, “Maybe I should have because 
[Washington] said he had been out of work for six months and he had impressed 
me as being sincerely concerned for the welfare of his wife and child.”376  He 
also commented, “I did not think at the time to go ahead and utilize psychiatric 
or psychological experts . . .  I did not think of that.”377 
Like Tunkey, Kachinsky did not think to hire an expert to assist in 
evaluating the several law enforcement interrogations of Dassey.  During his 
testimony at Dassey’s post-conviction hearing, Kachinsky plainly and 
troublingly admitted that he was not familiar with using an expert in the context 
of, for example, Miranda waiver:  
Q: Now, you’re also aware that – that -- in your experience that 
-- that defense attorneys will hire psychologists to evaluate a -
 
370. Id. at 23. 
371. Id. at 24. 
372. Joint Appendix, supra note 253, at 384. 
373. Transcript of Post-Conviction Motion Hearing Day 1, supra note 7, at 127–29.  Before 
meeting with Dassey, Kachinsky made a statement to the media that mentioned “a plea agreement, if 
one were to be reached, could include [Dassey] testifying against Steven Avery.” Id. at 127. 
374. Transcript of Post-Conviction Motion Hearing Day 2, supra note 335, at 51–53; Transcript 
of Motion Hearing, supra note 2, at 6–7. 
375. Joint Appendix, supra note 253, at 414. 
376. Id. at 416. 
377. Id. at 421. 
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- a -- a client on the question of whether that client could 
knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda warnings; 
correct? 
A: I don’t think that’s true. 
Q: You’ve never seen that happen at a motion to suppress? 
A: I -- I think, um -- I don’t know that there’s a test available 
where a expert witness can walk into court and render an 
opinion whether or not somebody is capable of waiving 
Miranda. 
Q: It hasn’t --  
A: I haven’t seen that. 
Q: It hasn’t happened in your -- 
THE COURT: Hang on a second.  The question was: Have you 
ever seen that? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
Q: Okay.  That’s all I need to know.  So, again, it wasn’t a red 
flag that you didn’t see in this case? 
A: No.378 
Had Kachinsky hired an expert—something Dassey’s new defense team 
did in preparation for the post-conviction hearing—he would have gained some 
powerful insights.  Dr. Richard Leo, an expert in interrogation methods,379 
testified, for example, that several of the interrogators’ statements to Dassey on 
March 1 amounted to impermissible promises of leniency.380  Dr. Leo, for 
instance, took issue with repeated assurances to Dassey that, if he is honest with 
investigators, then he would receive a more positive outcome.  Dr. Leo pointed 
to statements like, “No matter what you did, we can work through that,”381 and 
“You know, honesty’s the only thing that’ll set you free; right?”382  Dr. Leo 
characterized those and the several similar statements as follows:  
[T]hey’re suggesting that, um, being honest, which means 
telling them what they regard as honest or the truth, um, will 
 
378. Transcript of Post-Conviction Motion Hearing Day 1, supra note 7, at 60–61. 
379. Dr. Leo is a law professor at the University of San Francisco School of Law. Richard A. 
Leo, U. S.F. SCH. LAW, https://www.usfca.edu/law/faculty/richard-leo [https://perma.cc/U9T6-E65S] 
(last visited Aug. 14, 2018).  Prior to the Dassey post-conviction proceedings, Dr. Leo had analyzed 
more than 2,000 interrogations.  He had likewise authored several books, more than fifty articles, and 
several book chapters—among other publications.  Even prior to his involvement in the Dassey 
litigation, Dr. Leo’s work has regularly been featured in the news media and cited by numerous 
appellate courts. Affidavit of Dr. Richard A. Leo ¶ 3, State. v. Dassey, No. 06 CF 88 (Manitowoc Cty. 
Ct. 2007).  
380. Affidavit of Dr. Richard A. Leo supra note 379, ¶¶ 38, 43. 
381. Transcript of Post-Conviction Motion Hearing Day 2, supra note 335, at 173. 
382. Id. at 174. 
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allow, um -- will help him, um, and will allow them to work 
through it and that they will stand behind him.  Um, and he’ll 
get a better deal if he’s honest.  
Um, and if he’s honest, this will be okay.  But if he lies, that 
there -- there will be problems. 
So it seems to me that what they are suggesting here is that 
there will be specific negative consequences, general negative 
consequences, if he continues to say things that they don’t 
regard as honest.  That they don’t regard as the truth. 
But if he does, he will get help.  They will stand behind him. 
He’ll get a better deal.  And they even say, “The truth will set 
you free.”383 
Those parallels aside, Kachinsky’s performance was worse than was 
Tunkey’s.  Kachinsky, you remember, hired an expert to interrogate his client 
for the sole purpose of seeking the client’s cooperation with the state.  Tunkey’s 
ineffectiveness never approached that level of ineptitude. 
But just like the Supreme Court approved of William Tunkey’s conduct in 
Strickland, so too did the state judiciary approve of Len Kachinsky’s pretrial 
representation of Dassey.  Following his April 25, 2007, homicide conviction, 
Dassey was sentenced on August 2 to life in prison for which he will be eligible 
for parole in 2048.384  Dassey filed a post-conviction motion in state trial court 
on August 25, 2009, requesting a new suppression hearing and a new trial on 
the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.385  
The post-conviction claims centered primarily on Kachinsky’s conduct, 
including his poor performance at the suppression hearing.386  In particular, 
Dassey argued that Kachinsky’s collective actions constituted disloyalty to 
Dassey and, accordingly, amounted to a conflict of interest that relieved him of 
proving Strickland prejudice.387 
Following a five-day hearing that took place between January 15–22, 2010, 
the trial court denied Dassey’s requested relief on December 13, 2010.388  In its 
written opinion, the court relied on how much time had passed between 
Kachinsky’s representation and the start of Dassey’s trial.  In particular, said 
the court, “[b]y the time a jury was selected and Dassey was tried Kachinsky 
 
383. Id. at 175–76. 
384. Brief of Defendant–Appellant, supra note 3, at 46. 
385. Id. 
386. Id. 
387. Post-Conviction Memorandum Decision and Order at 7, State v. Dassey, No. 06 CF 88 
(Manitowoc Cty. Ct. 2010). 
388. Id. at 32.  
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was long gone from the case.”389  Moreover, the court reasoned, the state used 
very little of the evidence collected from O’Kelly’s May 12 interview and the 
interrogation of Dassey by Wiegert and Fassbender the next day.390  The court 
offered the following additional rationale: 
Nothing from O’Kelley’s May 12th interview in which he had 
Dassey incriminate himself found its way into the trial record.  
Other than a brief audio clip of a portion of a phone 
conversation between Dassey and his mother, which the State 
played without objection in its cross-examination of the 
defendant, and several questions asked on the cross-
examination of Dr. Robert Gordon, nothing from May 13th 
was introduced at trial.  And, the State made little more than 
passing reference to the May 13th phone call in its closing to 
the jury.391 
The court likewise rejected Dassey’s argument that Kachinsky provided 
deficient performance at the May 4, 2006, suppression hearing.  Although 
Dassey specifically highlighted Kachinsky’s half-hearted cross-examination of 
the state’s witnesses alongside his concession of viable Miranda issues,392 the 
court remarkably wrote that Kachinsky “adequately represented Dassey’s 
interests and cannot be said to have provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel.”393 
Dassey appealed the rejection of his state-level post-conviction arguments 
to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.  In his brief to that court, filed on December 
1, 2011, Dassey renewed his contention that Kachinsky provided 
constitutionally inept representation by trying to force Dassey to plead guilty.394  
He asserted that Kachinsky’s pretrial representation amounted to a conflict of 
interest, once more pointing to Michael O’Kelly’s May 12 interrogation of 
Dassey and Wiegert and Fassbender’s further interrogation the next day.395  
Dassey likewise again highlighted Kachinsky’s “curious decisions” at the 
suppression hearing, including his concession that Dassey was not in custody 
either on February 27 or March 1.396  Dassey also, in direct contrast to the trial 
court’s characterization, highlighted the impact of Dassey’s May 13 phone call 
to his mother, noting “the State played the climactic moment of the May 13 
 
389. Id. at 9.  
390. Id.  
391. Id.  
392. Id. at 10.  
393. Id. at 12. 
394. Brief of Defendant–Appellant, supra note 3, at 48. 
395. Id. at 57–59. 
396. Id. at 71.  
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telephone call—when Brendan told his mother that Steven made him do ‘some 
of it’—during its cross-examination of Brendan himself.”397  After emphasizing 
that the “May 13 telephone call would never have come into existence but for 
the disloyal actions of Attorney Kachinsky,”398 Dassey summarized his 
arguments as follows: 
These actions cannot be understood as the efforts of loyal 
counsel.  They are the actions of an attorney who “abandons 
[his] duty of loyalty and joins the prosecution in an effort to 
obtain a conviction”—a conviction that, in this case, would 
have taken the form of a guilty plea.399 
Calling the trial court’s opinion “a thorough, soundly reasoned decision,”400 
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals on January 30, 2013 took just six paragraphs 
of an unpublished opinion to reject Dassey’s claim that Kachinsky provided 
ineffective defense representation.401  In doing so, the per curiam court faulted 
Dassey for drawing, “no viable link between Kachinsky’s actions and any 
demonstrable detriment to him.”402  Moreover, the court reasoned, “Kachinsky 
was long gone before Dassey’s trial or sentencing.”403 
The Strickland analysis proffered by the Wisconsin state and appellate 
courts is deeply concerning for several reasons.  To begin with, considering first 
Strickland’s performance prong, both courts confusingly rely on the fact that 
Kachinsky “was long gone” the time of Dassey’s trial and sentencing.404  It is 
unclear, however, why the mere passage of time operates to remedy 
Kachinsky’s devastating and far-reaching errors.  After all, whether he was 
dismissed before, during, or after Dassey’s trial, there is no changing that 
Kachinsky’s decision to waive Dassey’s Miranda-related arguments forever 
altered Dassey’s available legal strategies.  As Justice Marshall aptly put it in 
his Strickland dissent: 
[I]t is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted 
after a trial in which he was ineffectively represented would 
have fared better if his lawyer had been competent.  Seemingly 
impregnable cases can sometimes be dismantled by good 
defense counsel.  On the basis of a cold record, it may be 
impossible for a reviewing court confidently to ascertain how 
 
397. Id. at 64.  
398. Id. at 66.  
399. Id. at 60 (citations omitted).  
400. State v. Dassey, 2013 WI App 30, ¶ 2, 346 Wis. 2d 278, 827 N.W.2d 928.  
401. Id. ¶¶ 8–13. 
402. Id. ¶ 11.  
403. Id. ¶ 13.  
404. Id.; Post-Conviction Memorandum Decision and Order, supra note 387, at 9. 
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the government’s evidence and arguments would have stood 
up against rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-
prepared lawyer.  The difficulties of estimating prejudice after 
the fact are exacerbated by the possibility that evidence of 
injury to the defendant may be missing from the record 
precisely because of the incompetence of defense counsel.405 
Moreover, despite the Supreme Court’s clear guidance to use “prevailing 
professional norms” to evaluate attorney performance,406 neither the Wisconsin 
trial court nor appellate court rely on—or even cite—the American Bar 
Association standards governing attorney conflict.407  Those standards, 
according to Strickland,408 serve to assist in the evaluation of an attorney’s 
maintenance of the duty of loyalty,409 the duty to avoid conflicts,410 and the duty 
to advocate the defendant’s cause411—among others.412  
The ABA Standards themselves caution that lawyers should not make 
statements to the media that are substantially likely to prejudice the case.413  
They likewise prohibit statements by attorneys in a criminal matter that 
unnecessarily heighten public condemnation of a defendant.414  Those standards 
each clearly reach and prohibit several of Kachinsky’s pretrial comments, 
including that Dassey was “morally and legally responsible” and that he was 
“stating the obvious” by concluding that Dassey’s confession would lead to a 
conviction.415  The Wisconsin state and appellate courts’ failure to address ABA 
standards that directly address and prohibit Kachinsky’s conduct serves to 
further highlight the overwhelmingly deficient analysis provided by those 
courts. 
 
405. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 710 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added).  
406. Id. at 688. 
407. The Supreme Court in 2012 reiterated the value of American Bar Association standards in 
evaluating Strickland claims. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012) (“Though the standard 
for counsel’s performance is not determined solely by reference to codified standards of professional 
practice, these standards can be important guides.”). 
408. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
409. Id. 
410. Id. 
411. Id.  
412. Id. (noting that counsel is also expected to consult with the defendant, keep the defendant 
informed, and bring sufficient skills and knowledge to allow for the trial to be a reliable adversarial 
testing process).  
413. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: FAIR TRIAL AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE § 8-2.1(a)(i) 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).  
414. Id. § 8-2.1(a)(ii).   
415. Transcript of Post-Conviction Motion Hearing Day 1, supra note 7, at 118, 122–23.  
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Finally, by focusing on the fact that the state relied on very little of Michael 
O’Kelly’s interrogation at trial,416 both courts dramatically underestimate 
O’Kelly’s impact on Dassey’s case more broadly.  The point is not that certain 
evidence obtained by O’Kelly was—or was not—used by the state.  Rather, the 
point is that Dassey’s most important advocate hired an investigator to 
interrogate and investigate Dassey himself, rather than holistically investigate 
the case on Dassey’s behalf.  The Wisconsin state and appellate courts’ 
characterizations of that behavior as constitutional is, simply stated, offensive.   
A brief consideration of Strickland’s prejudice prong uncovers still more 
concerning problems.  As noted, the prejudice portion of Strickland’s test 
requires proof that trial counsel’s errors deprived the defendant of a fair trial; 
that is, “errors [that] were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, 
a trial whose result is reliable.”417  Lower courts have interpreted that language 
to mean, essentially, that no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can 
succeed where evidence of the defendant’s guilt is overwhelming.418  The case 
against Dassey was hardly “overwhelming.”  Although the trial court 
acknowledged that Dassey’s March 1 confession was a “pivotal” piece of 
evidence,419 it nonetheless somehow concluded that “the quality and quantity 
of evidence against Dassey is such that there is no reasonable probability that 
the proceeding would have turned out differently.”420  Given the absence of 
physical evidence tying Dassey to Halbach’s killing,421 it is hard to defend—or 
even understand—the court’s position. 
The decisions by the Wisconsin trial and appellate courts to uphold 
Kachinsky’s representation of Dassey as constitutional, though upsetting, is 
sadly typical.422  Indeed, stories of Strickland permitting “the worst lawyering 
 
416. Post-Conviction Memorandum Decision and Order, supra note 387, at 9; State v. Dassey, 
2013 WI App 30, ¶ 11, 346 Wis. 2d 278, 827 N.W.2d 928. 
417. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
418. See, e.g., United States v. Calhoun, 600 F. App’x 842, 844 (3d Cir. 2015); United States v. 
Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 962 (7th Cir. 2002); Eaton v. Angelone, 139 F.3d 990, 994 (4th Cir. 1998); 
United States v. Alex Janows & Co., 2 F.3d 716, 721–22 (7th Cir. 1993). 
419. Post-Conviction Memorandum Decision and Order, supra note 387, at 20.  
420. Id. at 22.  
421. Dassey v. Dittmann, 860 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that “the State had failed to 
find any physical evidence linking [Dassey] to the crime”), overruled on other grounds, 877 F.3d 297 
(7th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Transcript of Trial Day 5, supra note 3, at 103. 
422. Following his state appeals, Dassey would pursue federal habeas grounds related to 
Kachinsky’s performance, though not precisely grounded in Strickland.  Those efforts likewise failed 
and the federal courts unfortunately never had the opportunity to evaluate Kachinsky’s pretrial 
representation of Dassey on pure Strickland grounds. See Dassey v. Dittman, 201 F. Supp. 3d 963, 991 
(E.D. Wis. 2016) (“Dassey never asked this court to consider whether Kachinsky rendered ineffective 
assistance under Strickland.”). 
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to pass muster” abound.423  Lower courts have, for instance, relied on Strickland 
to uphold defense attorney conduct that includes sleeping through portions of a 
trial,424 remaining totally silent during the proceedings,425 mental illness,426 
alcohol use,427 and drug use.428  With those results in mind, Strickland has 
unsurprisingly endured criticism from an array of sources.429 
That criticism has done little to effectuate meaningful change.  Strickland 
remains useless as a tool for improving defense attorney performance just as it 
is likewise worthless for holding bad defense lawyers accountable.430  At best, 
Strickland captures only the most extreme defense attorney behavior.431  Law 
 
423. William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical 
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 160 (1995); accord McFarland 
v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1259 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Ten years after the articulation of 
that standard, practical experience establishes that the Strickland test, in application, has failed to 
protect a defendant’s right to be represented by something more than ‘a person who happens to be a 
lawyer.’”). 
424. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505 n.20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 
425. United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1986). 
426. Smith v. Ylst, 826 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1987). 
427. People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 440 (Cal. 1989). 
428. Young v. Zant, 727 F.2d 1489, 1492–93 (11th Cir. 1984); People v. Badia, 552 N.Y.S.2d 
439, 440 (App. Div. 1990). 
429. See, e.g., Robert M. Andalman, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Under the 
Wisconsin Constitution, WIS. LAW., Feb. 1994, at 14, 17; Alan W. Clarke, Procedural Labyrinths and 
the Injustice of Death: A Critique of Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (Part One), 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1327, 1352 (1995); Geimer, supra note 423, at 138–47; Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System, 
Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
59, 67 (1986); Richard L. Gabriel, Comment, The Strickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1259, 1272–81 (1986); Alan Berlow, Lose That Lawyer, SLATE (June 3, 2008, 4:04 PM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2008/06/do-defendants-in-georgia-have-any-right-at-all-to-
competent-representation.html [https://perma.cc/554P-YV8Y]. 
430. For a representative sample of incompetent defense attorney behavior that Strickland failed 
to capture, see Escobedo v. Lund, 760 F.3d 863, 867 (8th Cir. 2014); LeCroy v. United States, 739 F.3d 
1297, 1315–16 (11th Cir. 2014); Rourke v. State, 912 N.W.2d 311, 313 (N.D. 2018); Anderson v. State, 
454 S.W.3d 212, 217–18 (Ark. 2015).  
431. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398–99 (2000) (attorney failing to investigate and present 
substantial mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of capital murder trial); Burdine v. 
Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 349 (5th Cir. 2001) (defense counsel sleeping/being unconscious during trial); 
People v. Miera, 183 P.3d 672, 678–79 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008) (defense counsel representing one of the 
prosecution’s witnesses in a different case closely linked to the one at bar); Helmedach v. Comm.’r of 
Correction, 189 A.3d 1173, 1179–80 (Conn. 2018) (defense counsel failing to communicate the 
prosecution’s fourth—and most favorable—plea deal to defendant before she testified in a murder 
trial); United States v. Velazquez, 197 F. Supp. 3d 481, 485–86 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (defense counsel 
failing to develop alibi evidence, failing to show the government’s proposed exhibits to defendant, 
which would have led to counsel learning of favorable evidence, and pursuing a line of questioning 
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schools must therefore make a specific curricular change: bring Strickland v. 
Washington into the investigative criminal procedure classroom.  Although 
Strickland is a major point of emphasis in the adjudicative criminal procedure 
law school course, the investigative criminal procedure courses often omit 
Strickland.432  That considerable omission does a disservice to law students 
nationwide given the prevalence of the investigative criminal procedure course 
in law school curricula alongside its presence on the bar examination.433  
Accordingly, many students may never learn about Strickland prior to 
graduating.  That is problematic to say the least; after all, nothing in the 
investigative criminal procedure course matters unless students commit to 
begin a good lawyer.  It really is that simple.   
V. CONCLUSION 
More than nineteen million viewers in the United States watched Making a 
Murderer in just the first thirty-five days after its release in 2016.434  A video 
 
with a corroborating witness that called the witness’s credibility into question); Moore v. Beard, 42 F. 
Supp. 3d 624, 643–44 (M.D. Penn. 2014) (defense counsel failing to properly interview and introduce 
an exculpatory witness and failed to impeach the prosecution’s key witness); Ex parte Overton, 444 
S.W.3d 632, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (defense counsel failing to review expert deposition and 
introduce medical testimony that would have contradicted most of the state’s case during capital 
murder trial); Maya v. State, 932 S.W.2d 633, 636 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (defense counsel representing 
both a husband and wife and failed to advise the defendants of the conflict and obtain a waiver of 
conflict-free counsel). 
432. The investigative criminal procedure courses in law schools nationwide most commonly 
focus on search and seizure (Fourth Amendment), confessions (Fifth/Sixth Amendments), and lineup 
procedures (Sixth/Fourteenth Amendments). See, e.g., Criminal Procedure: Investigation, STAN. L. 
SCH., https://law.stanford.edu/courses/criminal-procedure-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/M4T4-
5XWH] (last visited Aug. 24., 2018) (“This course, ‘Criminal Investigation,’ covers police 
investigation in the form of searches and seizures, interrogations, lineups, and undercover operations, 
and hence examines the Fourth and Fifth (and, to a limited extent, the Sixth) Amendment rules 
regulating the police in these endeavors.”); Criminal Procedure: Investigation, PACE L. SCH., 
https://law.pace.edu/courses/criminal-procedure-investigation [https://perma.cc/WQ7R-EYQB] (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2018) (“A careful examination is undertaken of the contours of the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Amendments as they relate to searches and seizures, the eliciting of confessions, and 
identification procedures.”); Criminal Procedure: The Investigative Process, CATHOLIC U. AM., 
https://www.law.edu/Announcements/2018-2019/Course-Descriptions.cfm [https://perma.cc/J7RZ-
Q283] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018) (“All sections of the course focus primarily on issues of 
constitutional criminal procedure relating to the Fourth Amendment (search and seizure), Fifth 
Amendment (custodial interrogations), and Sixth Amendment (interrogation and identification), and 
also include an examination of the defense of entrapment.”). 
433. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying citations.  
434. Jason Lynch, Over 19 Million Viewers in the U.S. Watched Making a Murderer in its First 
35 Days, ADWEEK (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.adweek.com/tv-video/over-8-million-viewers-us-
watched-making-murderer-its-first-35-days-169602/ [https://perma.cc/B7JG-SM7R]. 
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of Brendan Dassey’s March 1, 2006, confession was even included in the 
petition for certiorari filed on his behalf earlier this year—a rare occurrence.435  
It is therefore difficult to overstate the popularity—and importance of Brendan 
Dassey’s case.  The popularity, though, offers to law students an important and 
possibly unprecedented learning opportunity in the investigative criminal 
procedure classroom. 
Laura Nirider,436 along with her colleagues at the Center on Wrongful 
Convictions of Youth,437 have represented Dassey in the appeals process since 
2008.438  She recently wrote that interrogations like Dassey’s alongside false 
confessions more generally are happening “with disturbing regularity.”439  She 
added that law schools have a role to play in the false confession conversation: 
It’s time for law schools to do something about it. 
In fact, I’d like to suggest that law schools—national stewards 
of the noble profession of lawyering, responsible for producing 
the next generation of lawyer–citizens who will shape and 
change the law to come—are well situated to do something 
about problematic gaps in the law just like this one.440 
I agree with her.  Strongly.  With Dassey’s petition denied,441 using Dassey’s 
case as a teaching tool seems all the more important.  After all, forthcoming 
Supreme Court guidance seems unlikely given that the Court has not heard a 
juvenile interrogation case since 1979.442 
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